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ABSTRACT 
 
Despite the amount of research conducted on the accomplishments of Dennis Chavez, 
U.S. Senator from New Mexico, little in known about his activities in Latin America. 
Most of the studies completed to date focus on Chavez’s domestic accomplishments, 
creating an image of a man who primarily focused on New Mexico issues. This study 
seeks to expand the image of Dennis Chavez to incorporate his exploits in Latin America 
through an analysis of documents located in his papers, the Congressional Record, and 
various periodicals. An analysis of the available documentation reveals that Dennis 
Chavez created a vision that the entire Western Hemisphere would be united as allies, 
trading partners, and neighbors based on the ideals of the Good Neighbor Policy. From 
the mid 1930’s to his death in 1962, Dennis Chavez used the tenets of Inter-American 
Solidarity under the Good Neighbor Policy as a template for his vision of United States 
and Latin American relations. Dennis Chavez’s rhetoric changed during the years leading 
up to World War II, during World War II, and Cold War periods, but his vision of a 
united Western Hemisphere remained the same. However, despite his efforts in Latin 
 vi 
America, Chavez failed to make any significant changes in United States-Latin American 
relations, leaving behind small success and an incomplete vision. In combing through his 
papers, Congressional records, State Department records, and memoirs, this project will 
contribute to the ongoing scholarly dialogue on Dennis Chavez.   
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………..1 
CHAPTER TWO………………………………………………………………………..15 
CHAPTER THREE……………………………………………………………………...44 
CHAPTER FOUR……………………………………………………………………….74 
CHAPTER FIVE………………………………………………………………………..96 
CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSION………………………………………………………122 
BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………………… 127 
 
   1 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
Dennis Chavez is often cast in the light of a New Mexico patrón, who fought to 
develop New Mexico through some of the most tumultuous times in United States 
history. He was a champion of the New Deal, and a great manipulator of federal 
programs. He also was known for abuse of power and nepotism, but these were 
overshadowed by the positive impact he had on the lives of many New Mexicans as well 
as citizens of the United States, and various Latin American countries. It is this positive 
impact toward Latin America that I hope to explore to show how Dennis Chavez worked 
tirelessly to better the world of his generation.  
Dennis Chavez was born and raised in New Mexico. His heart was focused on 
raising New Mexico from the frontier territory he grew up in to a legitimate and strong 
member of the United States. One does not have to look far to see the impact he left on 
New Mexico. The highways New Mexicans drive on, the reservoirs and dams that control 
and secure their water, and the National Forests that give New Mexico the name “The 
Land of Enchantment,” were all materially impacted by Dennis Chavez’s efforts.   
The problem with this description of Dennis Chavez is that it is too one sided and 
incomplete. Dennis Chavez, by the end of his life, was one of the most effective Senators 
in New Mexico history. At the same time he was working to forward the cause of New 
Mexico, he too was working to champion the people of Latin America. When he first 
went to Congress, Chavez was quickly convinced that the Big Stick Policy and Dollar 
Diplomacy were not effective, if not a menace, to understanding Latin America. When 
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Franklin D. Roosevelt and Cordell Hull began the Good Neighbor Policy, Dennis Chavez 
supported it, and used it to advance his plan for Latin America.  His exposure to the Good 
Neighbor Policy was the beginning of his interest in, and life-long support for, cultivating 
a close relationship with the other nations in our hemisphere. 
The Good Neighbor Policy is one of the well-known topics in United States 
history. This was a concerted effort on the part of the United States to abandon 
intervention in Latin American affairs, expand commerce, foster scientific and cultural 
exchange, and act in general as a “Good Neighbor.” Most of the scholars agree that the 
primary agents of the Good Neighbor Policy were Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Summer 
Welles, and Cordell Hull—with each bringing their own personality and expertise to 
Latin American diplomacy. Perspectives vary on who began the Good Neighbor Policy, 
when it began, and its main purpose. For instance, Edward Gurrant’s early work 
Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy argued that Roosevelt began the Good Neighbor 
Policy for the sole purpose of bringing “mutual benefits to the entire Hemisphere.”1 
Bryce Wood in his book, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy, stated that Hoover 
began the Good Neighbor Policy, and Roosevelt carried it forward for primarily 
economic reasons based on the idea of reciprocity.  Irwin F. Gellman in turn espoused in, 
Good Neighbor Diplomacy ,that Roosevelt did have a clear policy specifically targeted 
towards Latin America. He further highlighted that the policy emerged from reactions to 
world developments both in Latin America and abroad. Finally, Frederick Pike in his 
book, FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy: Sixty Years of Generally Gentle Chaos, 
acknowledged the efforts of Coolidge and Hoover, but argued that under Roosevelt the 
                                                 
1
 Edward O. Guerrant, Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy, (Albuquerque, Nm, The University of New 
Mexico Press, 1950), 212. 
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Good Neighbor Policy took shape and was carried forward for economic, security and 
political reasons.  
In Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy, Guerrant provided a survey of the essential 
features of the Latin American policy of the Roosevelt administration. It was one of the 
first attempts to provide a comprehensive analysis of the full story. He attempted to 
demonstrate that the vast majority of the statements and actions made by key officials of 
the Roosevelt administration fit into five major categories: the abandonment of 
intervention, recognition of new governments, quest for law, expanding commerce, and 
cultural and scientific relations. Guerrant assumed that these statements and actions were 
a part of a well thought out vision toward Latin America. A significant portion of the 
book deals with the Inter-American system, peace initiatives, reciprocal trade 
agreements, and the exchange of ideas. The book is primarily a chronological description 
of events covering the period from 1939 to 1945, and offers little analysis. However, 
Guerrant shifted the discussion from a topical approach to a chronological approach, 
which he argued, was done to “emphasize the tremendous influence of World War II on 
the Latin American policy,” and presented “a more accurate picture of the Good 
Neighbor Policy from 1933 to 1945.”2  
 Starting with Montevideo in 1933, Guerrant analyzed the various Inter-American 
conferences, with significant attention paid to Argentina, the expropriation of United 
States oil properties in Mexico, and the general policy of non-intervention. Guerrant 
espoused that the “keystone” of the Good Neighbor Policy was Roosevelt’s hands off 
policy toward Latin America. He remarked that from the time Roosevelt was inaugurated 
                                                 
2
 Guerrant, Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy, VII. 
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in 1933 to his death in 1945 the United States strictly adhered to the idea of 
nonintervention. He also argued that the Inter-American Conferences played a crucial 
role all the way through the Truman administration culminating in the publication of the 
“Blue Book” by the State Department in 1946. The “Blue Book” was a systematic 
analysis of the Argentine problem in regards to World War II. Guerrant also provided a 
concise analysis of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements. He then moved on to the impact of 
Roosevelt’s science, technical, and cultural programs. Finally, Guerrant discussed the 
wartime policy of the United States in which he maintains the United States achieved 
most of its goals in Latin America. As an early work on the subject, Guarrant provided a 
good survey of the major developments within the Good Neighbor Policy. However, 
there was much work to be done on the subject.   
In The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy, Bryce Wood traced the origins of 
the Good Neighbor Policy from the intervention in Nicaragua in 1926-27 to its final days 
after the death of Roosevelt. He argued that the public reaction to “Imperialism” spurred 
a new evaluation of the United States Latin American policy in the late 1920s. Wood 
stated, “At the end of World War I, the United Sates found itself in an unprecedented 
position with the twenty countries of Latin America.”3 The power of the United States in 
Latin America was unchallenged and unrivaled by any other power around the world, 
especially when it came to the Panama Canal. Because the United States was primarily 
unchecked, many Latin American republics distrusted and feared the “Colossus to the 
North.” Because of this distrust, Wood argued that relations between North and South 
America were deteriorating and that the origins of the Good Neighbor Policy are found in 
                                                 
3
 Bryce Wood, The Making of the Good neighbor Policy, (New York, WW Norton Company Inc. 1961), 3. 
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the Hoover administration which attempted to improve relations in 1927 after a serious 
situation in Nicaragua.  
Wood claimed that, “the intervention in Nicaragua…soon became a complicated 
and difficult undertaking, and was the principal experience that brought about durable 
and significant changes in policy before 1933.”4 The significance of this event, Wood 
states, “becomes apparent when it is remembered that with the Peace of Tipitapa in 1927 
there commenced a period of about thirty years in which the United States refrained from 
the use of its armed forces to impose its will upon the nations of Latin America.”5 This 
affair and the “war scare” gave the Coolidge and Hoover administrations reason enough 
to abandon an interventionist policy in Latin America.  Wood also suggests that the 
Roosevelt administration only followed suit after a bad experience in Cuba. 
By 1928 it became apparent that the United States needed a set of new principles 
to guide its policy in Latin America. The Monroe Doctrine, as a guide, was based on a 
threat to the Western Hemisphere from abroad. Also, military intervention became very 
costly, both monetarily and politically. Wood claimed that the shift in policy from the old 
policy to a new one was born more out of experience and disenchantment than some 
intellectual analysis or calculation. 
 Wood further asserted that even though the shift began with the Hoover 
administration it was the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration that made significant 
changes in policy that came to be known as the Good Neighbor Policy. He emphasized 
that the Good Neighbor Policy was worked out in steps and was not a coherent self-
contained policy that was well thought out and executed. Wood saw the actions of 
                                                 
4
 Wood, The Making of the Good neighbor Policy, 5. 
5
 Ibid., 5-6. 
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Roosevelt, Hull and Welles as a systematic retreat from the defense of United States 
businesses’ property rights in search of good will in Latin America.    
Wood outlined three principal aspects of the Good Neighbor Policy. First, was the 
discussion of nonintervention and noninterference—that is the United Sates would not 
undertake further military action against any Latin American countries, nor use its 
influence to interfere or direct their internal policies. Second was the failure of reciprocity 
from Latin American republics. Wood argued that once nonintervention was accepted, 
policymakers struggled to answer the question of how to protect the lives and property of 
United States citizens and promote democracy within Latin America without the use of 
force. Eventually, Wood postulated, they settled on the idea of reciprocity. Reciprocity in 
the case of the Good Neighbor Policy was the idea that if the United States did not 
intervene militarily or interfere in their sovereign rights, Latin American republics would 
in turn respect the property and lives of the United States. Unfortunately this ideal of 
reciprocity was ineffective because it was too slanted towards the United States and Latin 
American Countries did not trust the United States had their best interests in mind.  
Ultimately it became necessary for the United States to adopt another set of policies. The 
final aspect of the Good Neighbor Policy was Pacific Protection, or the settlement of 
disputes about properties expropriated through negotiation and arbitration. Once the use 
of force to resolve property disputes was no longer an option, the State Department 
induced those private individuals and corporations adversely affected by property 
disputes in Latin America to change their practices and policies in order to fit within the 
overall interests of the United States. This phase of the good Neighbor Policy unfolded 
from 1933 to the advent of World War II. 
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Irwin F. Gellman’s addition to the dialogue, Good Neighbor Diplomacy: United 
States Policies in Latin America, 1933-1945, reiterated the primary claims of Bryce 
Woods and Edward Guerrant. Gellman asserted that the Republican efforts in the 1920’s 
did not constitute a clearly stated and executed policy, and only during the Roosevelt 
administration was a clear policy was formed. Gellman further argued that the Good 
Neighbor Policy was not a well thought out set of actions, but a series of reactions to 
developments and circumstances in Latin America and Europe. He further argued that the 
term “Good Neighbor Policy” was an accident of rhetoric, but provided a convenient 
umbrella to lump the numerous changes in policy towards Latin America.  
Another aspect of Gellman’s work is the assertion that Roosevelt’s efforts in Latin 
America should not be viewed outside the context of other international developments. 
For instance, he explained how the developments in Europe leading up to World War II 
created an environment where it was more acceptable to support Western Hemisphere 
regionalism instead of more European entanglement. He describes how Roosevelt could 
gain support for his Latin American policies in Congress and in the public much easier 
than he could gain support for his policies in Europe.  
Gellman, like most Good Neighbor authors, maintained that the primary aspects 
of the Good Neighbor Policy were the abandonment of interventionist policies, the 
initiation of economic measures that would converge during World War II into a distinct 
foreign aid program, and the active cultivation of cultural and military contacts under the 
guise of the Inter-American system. He argued that each of these aspects aided in 
creating stability for United States interests, broadly defined as United States property 
and lives. Gellman also echoed that the Good Neighbor Policy was spearheaded by 
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Roosevelt, Sumner Welles, and Cordell Hull, and that the policy began to fall apart first 
with a mutual distrust between Welles and Hull and then completely began to falter with 
their resignations. The final nail in the Good Neighbor’s coffin was the death of 
Roosevelt. Latin America would not see a concerted effort like the Good Neighbor Policy 
until John F Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress.    
Finally, Frederick Pike’s work, FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy: Sixty Years of 
Generally Gentle Chaos, was a welcomed addition to the history about the Good 
Neighbor Policy. Pike took his readers from the Republican years of the 1920s to the 
after-effects towards the end of the twentieth century.  Although his work did not 
drastically depart from the main arguments made by the previous authors, Pike did offer 
new insights into the role that the Great Depression and the American public played into 
the formulation of the Good Neighbor Policy. In his work he outlined how the economic 
situation around the world as a result of the Great Depression and a distrust in further 
European intervention as a result of World War I,  created a more receptive public 
towards Latin America involvement as many became isolationist in nature. Pike 
maintained that the Good Neighbor Policy was capitalized by Roosevelt, and driven by 
Welles and Hull. However, Pike argued that world circumstances drove hemispheric 
policy more than any grand vision of neighborliness. In fact, Pike argued that the Good 
Neighbor Policy was more about economic, defensive and political gains, and once the 
economic and security concerns subsided, so too did the Good Neighbor Policy, 
essentially marginalizing Latin America for the rest of the century.   
 As the United States flourished in the 1920s it marginalized those who were 
unable to participate. Often these groups were defined by race, ethnicity and economic 
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status. Even though Bryce Woods argued that the Good Neighbor Policy began with the 
Hoover and Coolidge administrations, good economic times made Latin America less 
relevant for any real policy to emerge. When the Great Depression struck, Pike argued, 
Americans became more welcoming towards Latin Americans, and this formed the 
foundation for Roosevelt to begin to build the Good Neighbor Policy. Pike argued that 
the Americans distrust of Wall Street and European entanglements really left Roosevelt 
no choice but to develop better hemispheric relationships.
6
 Pike stated, “to some 
considerable degree, American interest in Latin America that made possible the Good 
Neighbor Policy era grew out of disillusionment with Europe and a desire to isolate not 
only the United States but all of the Americas from old world contagion.”7 Pike pointed 
to the failure of the London Conference and the success of the Nye Hearings as 
reinforcing isolation from Europe and pushing more investment in Latin America. 
Roosevelt acknowledged this fact, and from his inaugural speech on he sought to create 
the impression that Latin America counted.
8
  
 Pike stuck to the assertion of most Good Neighbor scholars that Roosevelt, Hull, 
and Welles were the primary agents of the policy. According to Pike, Roosevelt left the 
primary functions of the Good Neighbor Policy to Welles and Hull, and only intervened 
when a compromise needed to be made. Pike asserted that Hull set many of the policies 
and operated within the guidelines of free enterprise and free trade. He also claimed that 
Hull lost his cool often, especially with those who did not agree with him. Conversely 
was Welles was not vested in perpetuating United States capitalistic pursuits, which often 
                                                 
6
 Frederick B. Pike, FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy: Sixty Years of Generally Gentle Chaos, (Austin, TX, 
University of Austin Press, 1995), 29. 
7
 Pike, FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy: Sixty Years of Generally Gentle Chaos, 31. 
8
 Ibid.,136. 
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put him at odds with Hull. Pike suggests, Roosevelt often bounced between the two 
looking for some sort of compromise.
9
  
 Finally, Pike asserted that the Good Neighbor Policy was driven less by 
some benevolent vision and more from the perspective of economic and security 
concerns, which were one and the same. He stated, “Ultimately for the United States to 
be strong enough to defeat any and all potential enemies, it would have to develop its 
economic capacity to the fullest degree.”10 Pike asserted that it was from this perspective 
that the United States gave up intervention and sought out stronger economic and 
defensive ties. Pike asserted that the United States operated from a stance of reciprocity 
and only sought to be as good a neighbor as required to get what it needed economically 
and defensively.  
It was within the context of the Good Neighbor Policy that Dennis Chavez 
formulated his ideas toward Latin America. He championed non-intervention, economic 
and cultural development, and hemispheric defense. Chavez viewed the Good Neighbor 
Policy as the solution to many problems within the Western Hemisphere. He simply 
believed that if the United States would make good on its promises toward Latin 
America, she would have strong military, economic, and cultural allies that would 
ultimately strengthen the United States. Once the debate on entering another European 
war arose, Dennis Chavez was adamant that the United States strengthen its ties with 
Latin America, and limit its ties with Europe. Once World War II started, he supported 
the war in the only way he could—calling upon the resources of Latin America. After the 
war, Chavez worked to shore up Inter-American Solidarity in direct opposition to 
                                                 
9
 Ibid., 7. 
10
 Ibid., 174. 
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Communism. He saw the destitute and unstable countries of Latin America as a perfect 
foundation for the roots of Communism. He believed that if the United States did not 
address the poor uneducated people of Latin America, the security of the United States 
was at risk. Also after the war, Chavez tried to cultivate closer relations for economic 
reasons. This support for Latin America would draw him into a very controversial 
position during the initial rise of Juan D. Perón; President of Argentina, dictator, and 
eventual thorn in the United States State Department’s side.  
Dennis Chaves supported Latin America because of his devotion to the idea of 
Inter-American Solidarity. Dennis Chavez stated “I take special interest in Latin-
American affairs, perhaps because I am of Spanish ancestry, but principally because I 
believe that a strong union of western hemisphere nations is the surest means of 
promoting international peace today. If our countries are strong industrially, 
economically, and politically, we can assure peace for the world because none will dare 
attack us.”11 
A study of Dennis Chavez’s interests in Latin American affairs completes the 
picture painted of a great man in New Mexican and United States history. Just like an 
author, poet, or artist is best known by his/her most famous work, leaving their 
unfinished work forgotten or diminished, Dennis Chavez is best known for his domestic 
policies, and is hardly recognized for his work in Latin America—a masterpiece cut short 
by his death in 1962.  
Throughout his career as a Democratic statesman of New Mexico from 1933 to 
1962 Dennis Chavez was a masterful politician and leader. His exploits in that regard 
                                                 
11
 Good Highways –Promoters of Good Will, Dennis Chavez to American Road Builders Association, 
February 9, 1949, Dennis Chavez Papers, MSS 394,Center for Southwest Research, University of New 
Mexico. 
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have been recorded and written about by Rosemary Diaz in, “El Senador, Dennis Chavez: 
New Mexico Native Son, American Senator and Statesman, 1888-1962,” Edward 
Lahart’s, “The Career of Dennis Chavez as a Member of Congress, 1930-1934,” and Roy 
Lujan’s, “Dennis Chavez and the Roosevelt Era, 1933-1945.”  All of these works provide 
an outstanding overview of Dennis Chavez’s accomplishments politically within the 
United States, but ignore his beliefs, impact and accomplishments in Latin America 
throughout and beyond Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy. 
Lahart’s 1958 master’s thesis focused primarily on Chavez’s involvement in state 
politics, the House of Representatives, and his campaign for the Senate seat in 1934 
against Bronson Cutting. He focused mainly on political stories and only covered a very 
concise time period. Lahart also ignored Dennis Chavez’s beliefs and actions in Latin 
America. Likewise, Roy Lujan’s dissertation “Dennis Chavez and the Roosevelt Era, 
1933-1945”, focused solely on Dennis Chavez and domestic issues. Lujan’s primary 
focus was on how Chavez sought to incorporate New Deal projects into New Mexico and 
chronicled how Chavez became an influential “Patron” in New Mexico politics. He 
covered a wide range of topics to include public works in New Mexico, POW’s, Native 
American issues, and his efforts with Civil Rights and Fair Employment practices. 
Unfortunately Lujan made little mention of Dennis Chavez and Latin America. 
Rosemary Diaz’s dissertation is a biography of Dennis Chavez beginning with the 
arrival of the Chavez family in New Mexico during the re-conquest of the Pueblos to his 
death in 1962. She touches on a number of topics ranging from his political 
indoctrination as a young man, his aspirations and accomplishments during the Great 
Depression, and his impact during World War II and post war periods. She mentions in 
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her introduction that “an unappreciated legacy of El-Senador involves his international 
and Western-Hemispheric influence.”12  
In my opinion the largest gap in the body of literature is Dennis Chavez and his 
exploits in Latin America stemming from the Good Neighbor Policy and on into the Cold 
War era. In my study I hope to bring an in-depth analysis of Dennis Chavez’s 
involvement in Latin America. There have been sporadic comments throughout other 
studies on his accomplishments, but all have left several questions unanswered. First, 
why did Dennis Chavez take an interest in United States foreign policy in general and 
Latin American foreign policy specifically? Second, what was his over arching 
philosophy towards United States-Latin American relations? Third, what was Dennis 
Chavez’s view of Latin America during the years leading up to and during World War 
II.? Fourth, how did he adapt his philosophy during the beginning of the Cold War? Fifth, 
why did he interact with Argentine president, Juan D. Perón, when the United States 
State Department did not trust him, and how did this interaction fit into his over arching 
philosophy? Sixth, what role did Puerto Rico play in his view of Latin America, and how 
did it fit into his philosophy?  
To answer these questions, I have broken this study down into four chapters. The first 
chapter discusses Dennis Chavez’s position towards Latin America during the years 
leading up to World War II. Chapter two shows how he adapted his philosophy to the 
pressures of the Cold War. Chapter three discusses the tensions between Argentine 
president Juan Perón and the United States, Dennis Chavez’s involvement with Perón, 
                                                 
12
  Rosemary T. Diaz, “El Senador, Dennis Chavez: New Mexico Native Son, American Senator and 
Statesman, 1888-1962,” (masters thesis, Arizona State University, 2006), 9.  
   14 
 
 
and how it fits into his philosophy. Lastly, chapter four specifically addresses what role 
Dennis Chaves played in Puerto Rican development and why.  
 Throughout his career, Dennis Chavez was a champion and advocate throughout 
Latin America. In his support for Puerto Rico, and his call for investment in Latin 
America, he espoused an overarching philosophy centered on the idea of Inter-American 
Solidarity.  Dennis Chavez religiously espoused that the United States should invest in, 
and support, inter-American solidarity more vigorously than any other relationship 
around the world. He was deeply drawn to Latin America for two reasons. First, his 
connection to the majority of Latin Americans through the Spanish language and heritage 
provided a natural link and affinity. Secondly, Dennis Chavez viewed the pressures of the 
development of Latin American countries as similar to those experienced in his native 
state of New Mexico. Because of who he was and how he fit into the history of the time, 
Dennis Chavez was called to play a role on the world stage. He answered that call, and 
his successes and failures impacted his world then and our world today. 
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Chapter Two 
World War II, Latin America, and Dennis Chavez 
 
One of the most patent examples of Dennis Chavez’s philosophy toward Latin 
America is found in examining his actions leading up to and during World War II. During 
this time, Dennis Chavez chose to take the position of a Continentalist as opposed to that 
of a pure Isolationist or Internationalist.  In this Chapter, I will explore how as a 
Continentalist Dennis Chavez argued that the United States should not get involved in the 
war, and should instead invest in Latin America. He felt that the best way to protect the 
United States from any aggression was through promoting solidarity within the Western 
Hemisphere. In espousing his beliefs he came up with a six point plan, which was never 
adopted, to keep the United States out of war. However, once the war started he 
supported the allied cause with all his heart. One of the ways he did so was ensuring that 
the United States had adequate resources and supplies from Latin American countries. 
Thus began Chavez’s life-long promotion of Latin America. 
As Dennis Chavez began his role as one of New Mexico’s senators, the rise of 
fascist governments and their quest for territory drew the attention of many people 
around the world. Consequently, the question of whether the United States should get 
involved in this problem of expansion naturally was on many people’s minds. Dennis 
Chavez, like many at that time, chose to take an isolationist approach towards European 
affairs. Unlike most Isolationists, however, Dennis Chavez used the rhetoric of the Good 
Neighbor Policy to advocate strong economic and military ties to Latin America, what 
would later be called the Continentalist approach. It is important to recognize that Dennis 
Chavez did not create the Continentalist view, nor was he a major agent of the Good 
Neighbor Policy. He used these tools to help him define his foreign policy philosophy. 
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Prior to his election to the Congress and eventually to the Senate, Dennis Chavez 
watched as the United States rose from World War I as one of the world’s strongest 
nations. The high demand for United States machinery, automobiles, and farm equipment 
fueled investment in Latin America and abroad. Mark Gilderhus explains that during the 
postwar period United States exports to Latin America rose from 16.2 percent in 1913 to 
25.9 percent in 1918 and to 26.8 percent by 1927.  In the Caribbean, the United States 
dominated the market, accounting for 53.2 percent of imports in 1913, 75 percent in 
1918, and fell to 62.9 percent in 1927. As a consequence, United States investments 
increased from $1,641.4 billion in 1914 to $5,5369.7 billion in 1929.
13
 The increase in 
investments over time came as a mixed blessing. Many Latin American republics 
welcomed this influx of investment, but knew that it came with a price. Often times this 
money would come attached to United States foreign policy objectives.  
By the time Chavez took his Congressional seat there was growing consensus that 
the United States should steer clear of European problems as well. This was true of 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt and many other prominent politicians. The memory and fear 
of repeating the experiences of World War I dominated American foreign policy. 
Throughout the 1920s many Americans questioned the motives of the United States 
government’s involvement in the First World War. With the onset of the Great 
Depression and the change in political guard, the conservative internationalism of the 
Republican twenties became the object of scorn. Many Democrats came to believe that 
recent foreign affairs had served the interest of international bankers and investors—two 
of the most distrusted groups in America during the early 1930’s. These suspicions 
                                                 
13
 Mark T. Gilderhus, The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American relations since 1889, (Wilmington, DE, 
Scholarly Resources Inc, 2000), 60. 
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coupled with the economic nationalism of the early New Deal made an assertive foreign 
policy seem the work of the old fashioned, selfish diplomats. 
 These suspicions and a change in the political guard eventually led to the creation 
of neutrality laws specifically designed to prevent American involvement in another such 
war. In the 1930s, four such laws were passed. The first came as a result of hearings held 
by a Senate Select Committee in 1934, led by Senator Gerald Nye, Republican from 
North Dakota. This committee was charged with looking into the allegations raised in the 
book Merchants of Death (1934). This book claimed that the United States had been 
drawn into the fighting by an alliance between bankers and munitions manufacturers. 
Nye’s committee interviewed and questioned several businessmen, historians, and 
diplomats and came to the conclusion that the United States had not truly been neutral in 
the years leading up to their involvement in 1917. The committee determined that 
America could only have avoided conflict by avoiding financial dealings with embattled 
countries—that economic ties with countries at war would most likely result in war again. 
This quest for neutrality set the political climate during which Dennis Chavez formed his 
ideas about United States involvement in European affairs. 
   When it came to Latin America, Dennis Chavez would latch onto the philosophy 
of Inter-American Solidarity following his election to the United States Senate. He would 
carry this ideal all the way through his political career often drawing on its main tenets in 
many of his speeches and writings regarding Latin America.   
At the Inter-American conference in Buenos Aires on December 21, 1936 many 
American Republics agreed to a common set of principles known as the Declaration of 
Principles of Inter-American Solidarity And Cooperation, which formed the foundation 
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of the Inter-American system. These principles seemed a natural progression of an 
ongoing relationship that was premised on the belief that each country had a similar 
affinity toward a democratic form of government, ideals of peace and justice, similar 
goals politically, economically, socially, and artistically. This affinity obliged them to 
maintain solidarity through peacetime and war time, and work for the common defense of 
the Western Hemisphere—which is why Chavez welcomed and supported Roosevelt’s 
implementation of the Good Neighbor Policy.
 14
 
Part of the foundation of Dennis Chavez’s adoption of the Inter-American 
Solidarity principles was the Good Neighbor Policy of President Roosevelt and Secretary 
Hull.  Chavez saw the Good Neighbor Policy as an important shift in the way the United 
States viewed Latin America. He believed in the intent to treat Latin American republics 
as good neighbors instead of using Dollar Diplomacy and a Big Stick mentality.  During 
the early years of the Good Neighbor Policy, Dennis Chavez fully supported FDR’s 
efforts. He saw a bright future with Latin America and the United States enjoying a 
symbiotic relationship and willingly fit this belief into his overall philosophy.  
There were three principle aspects of FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy. First, was the 
advent of nonintervention and noninterference—that is the United Sates would not 
undertake further military action against any Latin American country, nor use its 
influence to interfere or direct their internal policies. The second aspect of the Good 
Neighbor Policy was “pacific protection:” and the settlement of disputes through 
negotiation and arbitration. For the first time in its relations with Latin America, the State 
Department put national interests first rather than the interests of private American 
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business. The final aspect of the Good Neighbor Policy was the creation of a network of 
trade with Latin America. 
During the years leading up to World War II, the Good Neighbor Policy had to 
transition from an economically motivated policy to one of defense and solidarity. Many 
of the Good Neighbor authors argue different points of change, but all agree that the 
United States had to change and did. Wood argued from 1933 on the United States and 
Latin America engaged in a game of give and take under the ideal of reciprocity for the 
protection of United State’s property and citizens. In 1939 and the years leading up to 
World War II, the United States increasingly became fearful of increased advances by 
Axis powers into Latin America, and thus shifted the focus of their efforts from the 
protection of property and lives to the protection and solidarity of the Western 
Hemisphere. 
15
 He argued that from the time of the Panama Conference in 1939 official 
statements paid less attention to reciprocity and the Good Neighbor Policy and was more 
dedicated to the continental solidarity.
16
 
Pike suggested that from 1933 to 1937 the Good Neighbor Policy on the surface 
appeared to be economically motivated. He stated, “From the president down, the persons 
who designed hemispheric policy concerned themselves primarily with figuring out how 
to cast the New World off from the economic doldrums in Europe and to summon a 
rising hemispheric tide that would lift all American boats.”17 Even though economic 
considerations were at the fore, security was always a factor to be considered. Before 
1937, security was defined in terms of the protection of United States investments from 
political and economic instability. By 1937, Roosevelt and his cabinet decided that they 
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could no longer afford to ignore the inevitability of a confrontation with Germany.
18
 
Roosevelt did not believe that the Western Hemisphere could be isolated from another 
major war in Europe, and therefore his focus was shifted from economic matters to 
matters of security.  
Guerrant argued very much the same as Wood and Pike, that is that the focus of 
the Good Neighbor Policy was in a way an effort to repair the damage from its 
interventionist policies earlier in the century. Guerrant argued that the United States 
“succeeded remarkably well in convincing the Latin Americans that the Colossus to the 
North had become the Good Neighbor.”19 During the years of 1937 and 1938, Roosevelt 
worked to gain the cooperation of Latin America in opposing Axis infiltration within the 
hemisphere, but that he and his administration had their work cut out for them.
20
  
Gellman argued that the United States began to speak of Inter-American solidarity 
after the appeasement at Munich in September of 1938. On November 6
th
 of 1938 Welles 
called for hemispheric solidarity at the Lima conference. Welles stated, “As a nation we 
will assure ourselves that we are in a position to defend ourselves from all aggression 
from whatever source it may arise, and to be prepared to join with our fellow 
democracies of the New World in preserving the Western Hemisphere safe from any 
threat of attack.”21 Some argued that this was a call for an American League of Nations, 
but Roosevelt retracted from that interpretation, and instead reasserted that the United 
States would defend the Western Hemisphere from foreign aggression under the Monroe 
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Doctrine.
22
 This reassertion of the Monroe Doctrine was of course directed toward 
Germany more than any other European nation. Gellman noted how Germany had won a 
great level of influence in Latin America during the Great Depression and had regularly 
distributed anti-United States propaganda.
23
 
For the most part Dennis Chavez agreed with the Good Neighbor Policy, 
however, he soon developed a different vision of what the policy should accomplish. He 
believed that United States policy should go further than supporting and investing in 
Latin America to ward against Axis incursion into Latin America. He argued that the 
United States should invest solely in Latin America and limit involvement in Europe 
altogether. For instance, he professed that the United States needed to increase efforts 
towards cultivating economic and cultural relations with Latin America. Second, the 
United States needed to arrange for and provide funds for the construction of a 
Nicaraguan canal and possibly one in Mexico at Tehuantepec. Third, the United States 
needed to build the transcontinental highways to and through Latin America, similar to 
the Pan-American Highway. Also, the United States needed to put into effect a free and 
independent competitive airway system throughout Latin America. Finally, the United 
States needed to arrange for long-term investments in improvements in utilities, 
communications, and power resources.
24
 Dennis Chavez wanted to make Latin America 
the United States strongest ally and trading partner.  
From 1936 to the bombing of Pearl Harbor, Dennis Chavez espoused that the 
United States should limit ties with Europe and focus most of its energy and money on 
                                                 
22
 Ibid., 77 
23
 Ibid., 78 
24
 U.S., Department of State, Publication 1983, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-194, 
351-352.  
   22 
 
 
developing its Latin America interests. Dennis Chavez’s main approach to World War II 
was rhetoric and did not result in any new legislation nor did it in any way change the 
course of the violence in Europe. Also, while recognizing the shared histories between 
the United States and Latin America, Chavez failed to recognize the strength of the bond 
between the United States and Europe. To Dennis Chavez, the European bond did not fit 
into his philosophy of Inter-American Solidarity. 
When it came to war and foreign policy there were two distinct groups of 
isolationists that emerged in the United States during the 1930s. Isolationism found 
expression in American politics for multiple reasons with most centered on the impact 
WWI had had on America and the world. There were primarily two distinct groups in 
Congress that represented the core of the isolationists. One group, in which Senators 
Hiram Johnson and William E. Borah were the leaders, firmly opposed the notion of 
collective security, insisting that the end product would always be war. They argued that 
the government of the United States should focus on American democracy at home with 
some consideration given to continental defense—essentially they were nationalists. 
Senators Gerald Nye, Bennett Champ Clark and Arthur H. Vandenberg led the second 
Congressional group. They agreed on the impracticality of American participation in 
international political cooperation. This group considered it essential that the Congress 
design neutrality laws to keep America from being drawn into war.  
 Both of these groups shared a disillusionment concerning American participation 
in World War I. Both groups believed that the American participation had been based on 
an erroneous decision encouraged by huge private loans by American firms to Britain and 
France, armament companies who stood to profit from a bigger war, British propaganda, 
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and the belief by President Wilson that the war could be used to create a world 
government.  
 There was a third group, though less significant, who supported isolationism in 
the 1930s. This group of isolationists is referred to as either “Continental Americanist” or 
“Continentalist ,”  and its members were among the progressive and liberal quarters of 
Congress. Many of these individuals were the most enthusiastic supporters of the New 
Deal domestic program. While they supported Roosevelt domestically, they were 
extremely critical of his foreign policy. They advocated for economic and social support 
for all the American republics. The main purpose of this group was to initiate vast 
improvements across the broad American civilization. They turned to the efficient, 
humanistic use of national resources and technical skills as a means for creating a 
civilization on this continent more just, stable and peaceful than anything Europe could 
offer. Continentalist believed that the United States had a responsibility to keep 
democracy alive and flourishing in the Western Hemisphere—both North and South 
America. Chavez belonged to this group. 
During the years leading up to World War II, Dennis Chavez used the rhetoric of 
the Continentalist group to advocate for peace instead of war. Instead of embarking on 
policies that might draw the United States into war, Chavez espoused that the United 
States should stay out of European affairs and support the Good Neighbor Policy.  His 
ability to speak Spanish and his cultural background made him a natural megaphone for 
the Good Neighbor Policy. On numerous occasions Dennis Chavez voted against political 
actions that entangled the United States in European affairs. With confidence, he put 
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forth the idea that the solution to keeping America out of war was the investment in and 
the strengthening of ties with Latin America.  
Dennis Chavez was reaffirmed in his position by many of his constituents in New 
Mexico. On many occasions he received petitions and letters requesting him to keep 
America out of World War II. Some of these letters begged him not to repeal the 
embargo and to not approve the Lend Lease bill in 1941.
25
 Dennis Chavez replied to one 
letter-writer, Mr. H.B. May that:  
After long and serious consideration, solely from the standpoint of the welfare of 
our beloved country, I arrived at my decision to vote against the repeal of the 
arms embargo. I want America to remain at peace. And though I don’t believe 
that the repeal of the arms embargo will itself bring war I am convinced in 
conscience that by not taking sides in the horrible conflict now raging in Europe 
our own participation in the future will be better avoided…History someday will 
tell us who is right on this question. I earnestly pray that whatever we do, Divine 
Providence will give us peace. 
26
  
He repeated similar words numerous times in the replies to his constituents who asked 
him to not repeal the embargo.  
Dennis Chavez’s words were transformed into action during the debates on 
neutrality late in 1939.  Senator Chavez addressed the Senate on two occasions, during 
which he advocated complete neutrality in the conflict of Europe. Following one of his 
addresses, Senators La Follette, Nye, Johnson and Senator Borah walked over and 
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congratulated him. Ten days before he died Senator Borah, the “Great Orator,” told 
Chavez that his speech on Neutrality was the best he had heard.
27
  
During a radio address, Dennis Chavez further espoused his beliefs as a 
Continentalist. He clearly advocated that the solution for American peace was south of 
the Rio Grande. He urged the American people to cultivate closer relations with Latin 
America and eschew any Anglo-American front against Fascism and Communism. On 
this note, Chavez often quarreled with the Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes, who 
advocated stronger ties with Britain.  Dennis Chavez goaded Secretary Ickes by pointing 
out that England and France were “bloated with the greatest Colonial Empires in the 
world…yet they welsh on their just debt to the American people.”28 No doubt he was 
making reference to the war debts during the First World War. Germany, France and 
Britain all owed the United States significant amounts of money in the form of War 
Debts. Dennis Chavez looked at their constant efforts to convince the United States to 
forgive this debt as defaulting on their responsibility to pay.  
Aside from his concern about the Europeans reneging on their promises to pay the 
United States their war debts, Dennis Chavez argued that we should not become 
entangled in relations with Europe because he believed that the root of the world’s 
problems in the 20
th
 Century had their origins in Europe.  He espoused that Europe was 
home to everything that was opposed to America’s values and beliefs, like Communism 
and Fascism. He asked the Senate, “Is this the choice we must make? Must we protect the 
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African and Asiatic Empires of France and England? Must we tilt the scale and make one 
great Soviet of all Europe, or must we cast our lot with the Fascist dictatorships?”29  
Chavez did not just limit his criticism of Britain and France to the events in 
Europe. For instance, in 1941, he stated that Great Britain had caused more friction in 
Latin America than any other European power. Chavez cited the amount of land owned 
by British subjects in Peru, Paraguay, and Chile as evidence of this friction. One of these 
areas was the large chunk of land then known as British Honduras in Central America. 
Chavez argued that this territory had been a source of tension between Guatemala and the 
British Crown for over eighty years. Dennis Chavez even berated President Roosevelt 
over this territorial dispute when Roosevelt initiated his Destroyers for Bases program. 
He stated in the Senate, “When the matter of trading ships for territory came up, Mr. 
President, was any voice raised to suggest that British Honduras, that even Belize, be 
given to the United States, that we might turn it over to our Latin American neighbor, and 
thus gain not merely her undying gratitude, but the good will of every other Latin 
American nation in the continent?”30  He furthered this argument by citing the Falklands, 
which Argentina claimed, but Britain held on to as the foundation for another dispute. 
Chavez said, “We profess a great interest in the advancement of Inter-American relations. 
We could have very easily said to the British, when we were trading boats for land, ‘ 
Here are some islands which really aren’t of much value, strategically or otherwise, but 
which we think ought to go to Argentina. She has a gold claim to them; why don’t you 
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concede it?”31 Chavez further criticized Roosevelt over the choice to align the United 
States with Europe and stated it was “contrary to established policy,” expressed 
throughout United States history. Chavez cited as evidence the abrogation of the 1778 
alliance made with France in 1798 by Congress, and the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of 1901 
abrogating the original Clayton-Bulwer treaty moving England out of the picture with the 
Panama Canal.
32
  
Chavez simplified his argument down to a choice—a choice between investment 
in the Americas, or war in Europe. He argued that, “America is faced with the crucial 
choice—Pan-Americanism or War!”33 Involvement in Europe, he argued, meant a long 
protracted struggle with the totalitarian powers for imperialistic mastery of the world. If 
that choice was made, Chavez believed that it would prove costly—in both lives and 
treasure. Chavez alleged that the peace, welfare, and fate of the United States would most 
certainly be placed in jeopardy if America became involved in another World War.
34
  
America, he espoused, became a great nation because of its policy of non-interference in 
European affairs, and strict confinement of foreign interests in the Western Hemisphere.
35
  
Chavez did not just sit behind the podium and criticize, warn, and petition, he also 
spoke of a vision of what the United States should do to limit interaction with Europe by 
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promoting investment in Latin America. Chavez insisted that the United States should 
promote at all costs, commercial, cultural, and political relations with Latin America. The 
plan for Latin America, he envisioned, should include the development of close cultural 
ties, the facilitation of travel and the creation of a powerful economic coalition. The 
exchange of students should begin as soon as possible. Chairs for teaching of Latin 
American history should be created and Latin American history and culture should be 
required courses in United States secondary schools. To facilitate travel, airways and 
steamships should be subsidized.
36
 The Pan-American Highway and interlinking roads 
should be constructed. Cable and radio facilities should be improved and new ones 
should be built.
37
  
To make his vision a reality, Dennis Chavez proposed a six-point formula to, in 
his words, “Profit out of Peace” instead of “Profit out of War.”38 First, he urged, the 
United States to develop a national defense system, “at peace-time prices for labor and 
materials,” to such a point that no nation or combination of nations would dare attack the 
United States. Second, he proposed that the United States cultivate economic relations 
with Latin America, if necessary by subsidizing manufacturing and shipping. Third, 
Chavez felt that the facilities at the Panama Canal should be enlarged and fortified. 
Fourth, the United States should provide funds for the construction of a Nicaraguan Canal 
and possibly the Mexican-Tehuantepec Canal. Fifth, Chavez argued that money and 
materials should be set aside for the building of additional trans-continental highways 
through Latin America comparable to the Pan-American Highway. Sixth, under suitable 
guarantees, Chavez urged the United States to arrange for long term investments in Latin 
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America, improvements of a permanent nature, such as utilities, including transportation 
facilities, communications, and water-power resources.
39
 Dennis Chavez proposed that 
such a project would cost approximately $10,000,000,000.
40
 
Dennis Chavez’s belief that stronger relation with Latin America would ensure 
peace for America separated him from the other Isolationists like Borah and Nye who 
advocated total isolationism. Chavez stated,“ It is perfectly true that we cannot live in 
economic isolation from the rest of the world and maintain prosperity…modern 
conditions force all nations into closer ties.”41 With the usual anti-European rhetoric, 
Chavez often asserted, that he wanted political isolation from “the border disputes and 
blood feuds of Europe” and a renewed engagement in Pan-Americanism. To Dennis 
Chavez, the answer to the isolation problem was investment in Latin America. Based on 
what he witnessed during World War I, Dennis Chavez argued that war in Europe led to 
America being cut off from traditional European markets forcing trade to be diverted to 
neutral markets. Because of this, Chavez argued, those markets should be in Latin 
America.
42
 He was convinced that if the United States devoted itself to the Western 
Hemisphere the war in Europe could not be brought to American shores. The combined 
economic and militaristic might of the Americas, he argued, would virtually make it 
impossible to attack and render inconsequential who dominated the rest of the world.  
As Dennis Chavez examined the history of our foreign relations with Latin 
America, he saw countless black pages that needed to be overcome in order for his plan 
to work. He knew that the pages of history revealed events that totally eclipsed “the pious 
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but hypocritical platitudes of our statesmen who, while boasting of friendship and non-
aggression, set out methodically and successfully to impose our might on our American 
neighbors.”43 In a speech delivered in 1940, Chavez spoke of how the United States 
intervened time and time again in the economic and political affairs of Central and South 
American nations, referencing the United States actions in the Panama Canal, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Haiti, and Santo Domingo. These actions, he argued, earned the United States 
the hatred and distrust of Latin Americans—acquiring for the United States the names of 
“Yankee Imperialists,” and the “Colossus of the North.” Chavez also remarked that 
Americans typically saw Latin America as nothing but vast expanses of jungle and desert 
inhabited by savages in desperate need of American guidance and technology. He 
proclaimed that, “We crammed sewers and public utilities down the throats of our 
neighbor, but in so doing we earned for ourselves their hatred rather than their 
friendship.”44 This is why, he argued, in spite of six years of the Good Neighbor Policy, 
little or no headway had been made—Latin American countries welcomed the new policy 
but were unable to forget the sins of the past. However, since its inception, Chavez noted, 
Latin American countries had the opportunity to test the new spirit of friendship and were 
ready by 1938 to be convinced that the United States valued their friendship, if and only 
if the United States was ready to make good on its claims.
45
 
Unfortunately Chavez feared it was too late for the United States to make good on 
her promises. As Chavez looked deeper into Latin America he found that Germany and 
Italy were also courting Latin American interests, and in many respects were ahead of the 
United States. Chavez used this observation as a rhetorical device to add validity to his 
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claims towards Pan-Americanism. For instance, he pointed out that there were more 
Germans in every South American country than there were Americans, with the 
exception of Cuba and Mexico. He also cited how German trade with Latin American 
countries had increased year after year—even the German Lufthansa network had greater 
reach and connections than Pan-American Airlines. Furthermore, he noted, Germany also 
had eleven, 100,000 watt, short-wave broadcasting stations, with fifteen angle directional 
beams, giving them a dominant position in radio broadcasting in Latin America.
46
  
Using Brazil as an example, Chavez illustrated just how far the Axis Powers had 
already established a strong foothold in Latin America. Every day, he declared, radio 
broadcasts proclaimed the glory of Hitler and Mussolini and derided the slow movement 
of democracy. Also, Dennis Chavez pointed out, there were close to 200,000 Japanese 
immigrants buying and settling millions of acres of land and producing five million bales 
of cotton a year. Japanese scientists, archaeologists, and medical authorities also made 
regular lecture tours in Brazil. Germany had half a million residents in Brazil with a 
substantial portion of their youth belonging to the Hitler youth.
47
 Chavez also warned that 
Fascism was not just limited to Brazil in South America. Its antecedents were in fact 
spreading throughout Latin America. He cited how Germany had been selling munitions 
to every nation in South America and smuggling arms into Mexico. The Argentine army 
was largely German-trained as were those of Chile and Bolivia. Mussolini had sold both 
Chile and Brazil warships in exchange for nitrates and other resources.
48
 For Chavez, the 
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Axis Powers having this level of involvement in Latin America was disturbing and a 
major obstacle to achieving his goals of Western Hemisphere solidarity.  
As Chavez pointed out the growing influence of Germany, Italy and Japan in 
Latin America, he became impatient towards the inaction of the United States 
government. He stated, “The government at Washington is cognizant of fascist activities 
in Latin-America, and it is my own personal feeling that both the President and the 
Secretary of State would like to take a firm hand with respect to Latin-America, but 
hesitate because of uncertainty concerning sentiment in the nation. [United States]”49 He 
knew that the United States needed to play catch up and increase their efforts to 
counteract the influence the Axis Powers were creating in Latin America. He called for 
swift and focused action to be taken by the United States government. 
As part of that call for action, Dennis Chavez recognized that the United States 
should use radio as a way to link Latin America closer to the United States and combat 
the propaganda of the Axis Powers. Therefore, he advocated that the United States 
develop a powerful government short-wave broadcasting station, in addition to the 
General Electric and the World Wide Radio stations at Boston, and the then present 
efforts of the National Broadcasting Company. He viewed the efforts of these stations as 
ineffective and inadequate. With an expanded radio station, he ascertained, the United 
States could promote the Pan-American ideal. Through the radio, Dennis Chavez 
believed the United Sates could acquaint Latin Americans with the sincerity of the Good 
Neighbor Policy.
50
 It was with this in mind that Senator Chavez and Senator McAdoo 
introduced Senate Bill 3342 in 1938 to create “the United States Broadcasting Station” in 
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San Diego, California. The sole purpose of this short waved radio station was to 
broadcast to South America in an effort to overcome the broadcasting of Axis 
propaganda.
51
 
Broadcasting to Latin and South America was only part of the solution. Dennis 
Chavez also believed that the United States needed to demonstrate the sincerity of the 
Good Neighbor Policy by meeting even the smallest South American country on the basis 
of equality.
52
 As a result of this ideal, Dennis Chavez constantly supported the Pan-
American conferences and their goals.
53
 When the United States made agreements with 
Latin American countries to maintain neutrality, and established a neutral zone at the 
Panama conference in 1939, Dennis Chavez was in full support. Also, he was in full 
agreement when the United States agreed to not act within Latin America without 
consulting the other American nations first. With these agreements, however, Dennis 
Chavez saw a risk in further alienating the Latin American republics if the United States 
reneged on their promises. Dennis Chavez argued that if we went back on our word, 
Latin American countries would once again regard the United States as the “Colossus of 
the North” and would be skeptical of any goodwill or aid.54 
Unfortunately for Chavez, Roosevelt took a completely different approach to the 
European conflict. While Chavez’s rhetoric was geared towards keeping the United 
States out of European affair altogether, Roosevelt’s rhetoric was geared towards 
supporting Britain and France in their opposition to Hitler. There is no doubt that 
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Roosevelt aligned himself in direct opposition to Hitler and his allies. He made no secret 
of this fact. However, Roosevelt was bound by the Neutrality Laws and popular opinion. 
He had to find ways to give the Allies the support they needed, and work to convince the 
American people that it was in their best interest that dictators like Hitler be stopped. 
As the war raged in Europe and Asia, FDR knew that the United States’ 
involvement in the their conflicts was vastly unpopular, and in the face of the Neutrality 
Laws, a legal issue as well. He knew he had to work to convince the American people 
that involvement was in the best interest of peace and prosperity. During his famous 
Quarantine Speech in October 1937, FDR stated that the, “peace -loving nations must 
make a concerted effort in opposition to those violations of treaties and those ignorings of 
humane instincts which today are creating a state of international anarchy and instability 
from which there is no escape through mere isolation or neutrality.”55 During this speech 
he also reminded the people that the world was interdependent and held together by 
international laws and treaties.  He argued that it was “impossible for any nation 
completely to isolate itself from economic and political upheavals in the rest of the world, 
especially when such upheavals appear to be spreading and not declining. There can be 
no stability or peace either within nations or between nations except under laws and 
moral standards adhered to by all. International anarchy destroys every foundation for 
peace. It jeopardized either the immediate or the future security of every nation, large or 
small. It is, therefore, a matter of vital interest and concern to the people of the United 
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States that the sanctity of international treaties and the maintenance of international 
morality be restored.”56 
Roosevelt understood that he must convince the American people that the United 
States involvement in the war was a necessity. Roosevelt often used the events abroad to 
win over the American people for several pro-allied actions to include Lend Lease, which 
was a creative way of getting around directly loaning American money to Britain.
57
 
Under Lend Lease, the United States would give Britain the guns, ships and tanks they 
needed to fight the Nazis, only if they returned the items that the United States loaned 
them. Of course, one does not return military equipment used in war in the same 
condition it was loaned. So in reality it was the United States giving Britain the necessary 
tools to fight the war.   
By May of 1941 Roosevelt had come to the conclusion that the United States 
would indeed have to join the fight, but was reluctant to strike first. FDR wanted to be 
pushed into the war, rather than take the country into war. 
58
 FDR decided to help the 
Allies control the Atlantic. The Germans were sinking merchant ships faster than Britain 
and America could replace them. FDR knew that that the United States would have to 
increase its shipbuilding capacity, and at the same time expand patrolling to assure the 
delivery of supplies, essentially putting the United States in a non-neutral position. Even 
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when an American freighter, the Robin Moor, was sunk on June 11, 1941, FDR was still 
reluctant to join the fight. 
59
  
While Roosevelt offered rhetorical defiance to Berlin, and commercial aid to the 
Allies, for he was reticent to do anything that would force the war issue with the public or 
actively alter Hitler’s plans for Europe. Roosevelt aligned himself and the United States 
with the Allied cause without declaring war. Roosevelt understood that neutrality would 
not be an option in the future. He knew that for the stability of the world, Hitler must be 
stopped. FDR constantly had to work around public sentiment and the established 
Neutrality Laws to defy Hitler and his war machine. Even as Roosevelt waited for the 
right moment, the foreign policy of the United States was still focused on isolationism. 
Ironically it was the developments in the Far East that eventually pushed the United 
States into war with the bombing of Pearl Harbor. 
As we well know, isolationism in all its various forms did not work. Japan’s 
attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 shocked the nation and brought it into 
World War II. The many debates about where the United States should spend its time and 
money came to an abrupt end.  Once the United States chose to join the fight against the 
Axis powers, Dennis Chavez supported the war effort. He did so by getting involved in 
limited negotiations with Latin American countries for resources needed for the war. 
Just as the United States was jolted, so too were many of the republics in Latin 
America, for they feared they were vulnerable to attack. The only guard against such an 
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attack was cooperation and solidarity with the United States and her allies.
60
 By 
December 12, 1941, nine Latin American republics declared war on Japan, and January 
1, 1942, many signed on to the United Nations Declaration. In time all Latin American 
nations aligned themselves with the United States. While it took Argentina until 1945 to 
fully align with the United States, nevertheless they gave in to the pressure from other 
Latin American republics and the United States. The complex and contentious relations 
with Argentina during this time spilled over into the Cold War years and created a 
controversial situation for Dennis Chavez—a subject that will be dealt with later in this 
work. What is important during World War II is that Latin American republics proved to 
be an important ally to the United States during the war, contributing significantly to an 
Allied victory.  
Latin American support during the war manifested itself in many ways. Some, as 
in the case of Brazil and Mexico, provided direct military support by either dispatching 
troops, providing bases, or participating in international naval patrols. Also, many 
countries cooperated with the FBI to thwart Italian and German subversive activity in 
South America. Latin American countries also received some Lend Lease aid, however, it 
only represented 1 percent of the total given out to the whole world. Lend Lease to Latin 
America was limited solely to military items, while economic aid was funneled through 
the Export-Import Bank.
61
 
More important than their military aid was Latin America’s contribution in the 
form of vast quantities of strategic raw materials. Economic agreements facilitated the 
supply of urgently needed materials for the Allied war effort. During the war years, Latin 
                                                 
60
 Frederico Gil, Latin American—United States Relations, (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc, 
1971), 180. 
61
 Gil, Latin American—United States Relations, 182. 
   38 
 
 
American countries sent more than 50 percent of their exports to the United States and in 
turn bought 60 percent of their goods from the United States.
62
 The support given by 
Latin America was the ultimate result of the carefully crafted and cultivated Good 
Neighbor Policy.  
Like most of those in favor of neutrality, Dennis Chavez supported the war 
wholeheartedly once Japan had attacked Pear Harbor. Dennis Chavez was both disgusted 
and disturbed by Japan’s actions. During a Christmas address in 1941, he stated:  
I have been a disturbed witness to all forms of human intolerance; to a form of 
conduct which has been so aptly described as ‘man’s inhumanity to man.’ In my 
studied opinion, it is absolutely impossible to think of a condition more contrary, 
or more categorically opposed to the very essence, the veritable marrow, of our 
form of government, than intolerance, be it racial, religious, political, social or 
economic. In other terms, I cannot reconcile myself to the possibility of a really 
solid American lifting a finger, raising a hand, penning a word, or voicing a 
thought in conscious support of the hideous forces of intolerance, the poisonous 
fangs of which our fathers came here to escape….The Greatness of your America 
and mine has stemmed from the infinite variety of its background. Its greatness in 
the future will depend upon our willingness and determination to live together in 
harmony, in peace and in understanding. 
63
 
 When it came time to prepare for war Dennis Chavez did not hesitate to support 
the war effort. As a member of the Military Appropriations Committee, he voted to build 
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new airplanes, tanks and other weapons. For example, in 1941 he fought to support the 
National Defense program fostered by Roosevelt. Chavez prophesied, “I maintain that 
our national defense in the future will be…the airplanes of the future. I am for anything 
that may be done for the making of better pilots and for the bringing about of technical 
improvements in this field.” During the war he also pushed Congress to raise pay for 
nurses because the pay in the private sector was much higher than what was offered in the 
Army and Navy. He knew that the Army and Navy would need good nurses and doctors 
to win the war. His efforts resulted in a spurt in the enlistment of nurses. 
64
 
 However, Dennis Chavez’s greatest contribution to the war effort was his 
participation with Latin American politicians and businessmen to procure certain 
resources for the war. During World War II, Latin Americans contributed heavily to the 
cause of the United States. Many Latin American countries contributed necessary natural 
resources such as, crude oil from Venezuela, copper and nitrates from Chile, tin from 
Bolivia, quartz crystals used in radar and manganese from Brazil, cadmium and mercury 
from Mexico and many other lesser-known contributions. These contributions no doubt 
helped the United States and Allies win the war.  
Chavez participated in the transmission of resources with Carl E. Lucke of the 
Pan American Distributors, Ltd. This company had several branch offices throughout 
Central and South America and was responsible for facilitating trade within the 
hemisphere. Specifically, Chavez was involved in a weapons deal with Bolivia and the 
Pan American Distributors. In a memorandum dated June 24, 1941, Lucke outlined the 
purchase of arms from the Bolivian government, which were to be sold to the Russians 
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who were in dire need of arms. Among the items to be purchased were, 15,000 Mauser 
type, Model 1928, 7.65 caliber riffles, 50 heavy duty Vicker machine guns, 50, Breno 
light machine guns, 200 Schmeisser sub-caliber machine guns, 20 million cartridges of 
7.65 caliber ammunition, 5 million 9mm rounds, 75 cannons, 50 Stokes-Brandt trench 
mortars, 2500 aerial demolition bombs, 1000 fragmentation bombs, 1000 liquid fire 
bombs and 1000 incendiary bombs.
65
 Durring this transaction, Lucke sought Chavez’s 
help in contacting Joseph Tumulty about the Bolivian arms. In a letter to Chavez, Lucke 
stated that Tumulty had a Russian contact who was very interested in the Bolivian 
materials and needed his help in facilitating the deal.
66
 During another deal with Lucke, 
in September of 1941, Chavez contacted the Peruvian government about the purchase of 
airplanes from Canada. In this case, Chavez was to inform the Peruvians that the Free 
French would buy them immediately and it was to be a cash only transaction.
67
 
Similarly, Dennis Chavez found himself serving in the role of facilitating 
production of materials and equipment necessary for the war effort. For instance, in 1942 
a company by the name of Cemento De Mixcoac applied for priority status with the 
Mexican Government for a new rotary cement kiln in San Pedro de los Pinos. Cemneto 
De Mixcoac borrowed, what they called, a considerable amount of money to build this 
cement factory, and the Office of Production Management was impeding its construction 
by limiting the flow of supplies. They wanted this priority status so they could finish the 
project. In September of 1941, T. H. Lockett stated that the United States Cement 
Industry bulletin claimed they were only capable of producing 79.9 percent of their 
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capacity in July of 1941.
68
 The problem with getting this kiln built was the lack of steel 
being allocated to the company.  
 Dennis Chavez was approached by T. H. Harold for help with the rapid settlement 
of the difficulties in obtaining the steel. Mr. Harold stated in a letter to Chavez that he has 
“been in very close touch with the cement situation here [Mexico] for the past five 
months.” 69 Chavez went on to say he understood that the manufacturers are doing 
everything in their power to fill the demand for cement—even running obsolete 
equipment to its full capacity. Mr. Harold used Dennis Chavez’s desire to build a paved 
road from El Paso to Mexico City and the construction of the Pan American highway as 
leverage for the release of more steel. Mr. Harold stated “The cement companies point 
out however that with the present production capacity there is no possibility of producing 
any such quantity of cement without greatly augmenting manufacturing capacity.” 70 
Dennis Chavez responded to Harold’s letter by writing Donald M. Nelson, 
Director of the Division of Purchases at the Office for Emergency Management in 
Washington D.C. on October 23, 1941. Dennis asked the director to check into the status 
of Cemento De Mixcoac. In this letter he clearly stated he wanted the company to receive 
priority status. He stated, “The construction of defense highways and other defense 
projects in Mexico require considerable quantities of cement, and I understand that under 
their present production capacity it is impossible for the cement companies in Mexico to 
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furnish the cement that is needed.” 71 Because of this he states that the Kiln project of 
Cemento De Mixcoac is a very important one. The Office of Production Management 
replied to Dennis Chavez on November 7
th, 1941 that “the analysts of the Industrial 
Equipment Branch is actively reviewing the request and…definite action will be taken 
upon it within the next few days.”72  
There is no evidence that Dennis Chavez was successful in getting the company’s 
priority changed, however, this incident reveals that Dennis Chavez was looked to as an 
advocate for Latin American companies and countries alike.  
 As shown in this chapter, as the troubles of the Great Depression gave away to the 
pressures of World War II many Americans were faced with a choice to advocate 
neutrality and isolationism or involvement in another European war. Many Americans, 
still affected by the experiences of World War I, advocated neutrality and isolationism, 
which resulted in the Neutrality Laws and limitations on American foreign policy. As a 
part of this debate, Dennis Chavez threw his lot in with the Continentalists, who 
advocated investment in the Western Hemisphere as a means of pseudo isolation, and 
was a strong advocate for the development of Latin America under the auspices of the 
Good Neighbor Policy. He developed a six point plan for peace that primarily relied on 
investment both politically and monetarily in Latin America. In some cases he directly 
spoke out about the United States future allies in World War II as greedy imperialists 
with vast possessions worldwide. Once the attack on Pearl Harbor took place however, 
Dennis Chavez, like most isolationists, was forced to change his mindset from isolation 
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to war. Just as Dennis Chavez saw the roots for peace in Latin America, so too did he see 
the roots for ultimate success in the war effort. Once engaged, Dennis Chavez acted as a 
liaison between Latin America and the United States for the procurement of vital natural 
resources and military equipment. Little did he know that the purchase of large amounts 
of resources at below market prices would have a profound negative effect on the 
countries of Latin America in the future—a subject that will be addressed in the next 
chapter.
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Chapter Three 
Post World War II, Latin America and Dennis Chavez 
 
After World War II, Dennis Chavez urged the United States to keep up the trade 
and use of resources that had begun in Latin America during the war. In this Chapter we 
will examine the Cold War threat of Communist expansion into the economically 
troubled republics of Latin America, instead of Axis expansion. During this time period, 
Dennis Chavez maintained his view towards Latin America—that the United States must 
maintain hegemony through economic and militaristic means. He espoused that the 
United States should continue to invest in Latin America economically as well as 
militaristically to avoid the rise of Communist regimes. It is hard to say if Dennis Chavez 
viewed Communist infiltration as a serious threat or as a means to induce further 
investment by the United States. There is evidence to support both sides, however, there 
is a certain quality to his rhetoric that indicates that the threat was viewed as a means to 
gain United States dollars. Prime examples of his rhetoric can be found in his calls for 
support of Mexican oil and Bolivian tin. In each case he claimed that a lack of investment 
would lay the grounds for Communist revolution. Also, an example of his postwar views 
toward activities in Latin America can be found with his push for the completion of the 
Pan-American Highway, especially the Nicaraguan section. Here again he espoused the 
belief that a failure to complete this highway would leave Latin America weak and 
vulnerable in the event of a Soviet attack.  
 During the immediate Post-War period, his unwavering call for support of Latin 
America was often controversial, especially his rhetoric against the Marshall Plan and 
other European reconstruction efforts.  The Marshall Plan was one of the most significant 
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foreign policy decisions of the 20
th
 Century without which Europe could have never 
recovered as fast as she did. Again, Dennis Chavez was misguided in his rhetoric and 
statements, but his ardor for multi-faceted relations with Latin America continued to 
define his overall philosophy. 
 The world of foreign relations changed significantly after World War II. Victory 
over the Axis Powers relieved statesmen of the pressure of war, only to be replaced by 
the fear of the spread of Communism. This was a new foreign relations environment, and 
it called for a much different approach than what was used before. Like most, Dennis 
Chavez no longer supported isolationism and embraced the new state of foreign affairs. It 
is during this period that we see Dennis Chavez’s adoption of the Good Neighbor Policy 
and Inter-American Solidarity principles take true form. Chavez used the threat of 
Communism as a reason to continue and strengthen solidarity with Latin America. 
However, Chavez initially stated that, “I am in full accord with the foreign policy 
program of Secretary of State Byrnes, which is fully supported by President Truman,” but 
then he changed his rhetoric and criticized the implementation of the Marshall Plan.
73
 In 
some respect Dennis Chavez still wanted the United States to remain isolated in the 
Western Hemisphere. Like most, he changed his mind and believed that the United States 
was and should be the preeminent power in the world in direct opposition to Russia and 
viewed complacency as “suicidal.”74  
 Dennis Chavez, however, had a different vision than most policy makers on how 
to stand in opposition to Russia. First, he still believed that stability must be maintained 
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in Latin America to prevent Communist incursion into the Western Hemisphere. Along 
with that belief came his strong opposition to the Marshal Plan, and the reliance on oil 
from Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern States. His arguments were in stark contrast 
to the mainstream ideas of the time—even those of President Truman and Secretary 
Byrnes. Dennis Chavez simply maintained that the primary avenue for peace was a 
secure and stable Western Hemisphere, even when most policy makers were advocating 
increased relations in Europe—a notion that frightened Chavez, who on occasion 
espoused that, to engage in the affairs of the Europe would once again lead to world 
instability and war. 
During a trip to Mexico City in 1946, Chavez wrote on a note pad from Hotel 
Geneve in Mexico, “The spirit of Franklin Delano Roosevelt still exists in the world—the 
basic philosophy of good will must prevail. The Good Neighbor Policy must and shall 
continue. The peace of the world must be preserved—and we of the parliamentary bodies 
of the world must do all we can to preserve that peace”75 In a sense, Dennis Chavez was 
holding on to the principles of the Good Neighbor Policy in an increasingly changing 
foreign relations world. However, he saw that the end of World War II brought a serious 
deterioration in United States-Latin American relations, and argued that this created a 
perfect condition for the seeds of Communism to take root. The United States, he argued, 
had once championed the Good Neighbor Policy, but now shifted its focus from Latin 
America to Europe and Asia. This shift caused many Latin Americans to feel that the 
United States took them for granted after devoting years to building an effective inter-
American system.   
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One of the primary examples of this, he stated, was the economic impact World 
War II had had on Latin America. He highlighted how the sudden termination of the 
wartime demand for raw materials and the awareness of profound socioeconomic and 
political changes made Latin American governments anxious, and yet it appeared the 
United States government did little to help—instead, most of the aid went to Europe and 
Asia. During World War II, Latin American Nations contributed heavily to the Allied 
cause by providing necessary natural resources such as, crude oil, copper, nitrates, quartz 
crystals, manganese, cadmium, and mercury. These contributions undoubtedly helped the 
United States defeat the Axis powers, however, in some cases, heavy investments in the 
production of these materials and access to foreign markets led many Latin American 
countries to rely too heavily on a few commodities to support their national economy, 
which had adverse affects when demand for that commodity declined.  
That is exactly what happened in the years after World War II. As demand fell, so 
too did the economies of many Latin American republics.  “By the middle of the 1950’s 
the post war export boom had ended, imperiling both the general economic model that 
had been adopted by Latin American governments and the political alignments that kept 
them in power.” 76 With the viability of their economies in serious doubt, many countries 
feared they would fall into poverty and instability. This environment, Dennis Chavez 
asserted, was a fertile field for the seeds of Communism, and seriously threatened the 
security of the United States.
77
 
 During the war, Dennis Chavez promoted development in Latin America to fulfill 
many of the United States’ material and labor needs. Much to his dismay, the very thing 
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he promoted had a profound negative impact on many Latin American countries and 
created an environment that was ripe for Communist infiltration. Dennis Chavez, 
therefore, regularly made arguments for hemispheric solidarity to ward against this threat. 
He once quoted Dean Acheson’s statement that “A principle which is as fundamental as it 
is disregarded, is that in the organizational maintenance of power, relations with states 
which are closest geographically and in interest and purpose are the most important.”78 
Dennis Chavez used this quote to add credibility to his belief that the United States 
needed to maintain peace within its own hemisphere.  Below the Rio Grande, he saw an 
enormous supply of raw materials and manpower that was relatively easy to get to and 
protect. The only obstacle Dennis Chavez identified was that Latin Americans were 
reluctant to aid the United States further for they blamed the United States for their 
economic situation, and felt betrayed when the United States failed to create a plan for 
Latin America similar to the Marshall Plan. 
 To correct this potentially dangerous situation, Dennis Chavez argued that the 
United States should again invest more in Latin America than in Europe. In fact, he saw 
massive investments in Latin America as unquestionable. Because of this position he 
often found himself in opposition to the vast amounts of money being spent to rebuild 
Europe. Dennis Chavez saw the rebuilding of Europe under the Marshall Plan as 
potentially enticing for Russia to take the aid and incorporate it into their already 
expanding empire. These beliefs put him in a position opposite to the mainstream belief 
that a strong Western Europe was needed to check the expansion of Communism. Instead 
of a strong Western Europe to check Russian expansion, Dennis Chavez promoted 
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Western Hemispheric solidarity as the sure way to defend the United States and ensure 
that she was able to stand in opposition to Russia. He argued that Latin America’s 
proximity to the United States, with their abundant natural resources, and democratic 
disposition were the key to building a strong alliance against any potential Russian 
aggression. To him, the access to critical resources and materials were necessary to, in his 
own words, “keep the industrial economy of war in motion.”79 As a consequence, he 
believed the United States should focus its energy on that region, instead of Europe.  
But Chavez’s beliefs were counter to President Harry S. Truman, who believed 
that the United States should invest in the future of Europe to prevent the spread of 
Communism. After World War II, Truman became convinced that Stalin intended to 
extend Communist influence throughout Europe, especially Eastern Europe. By early 
1947, the president had a new foreign policy standing boldly in opposition to 
Communism. It was called the Truman Doctrine, later known as containment, and was 
focused on blocking Communist expansion anywhere in the world. Under Truman, the 
Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were the major 
manifestations of this doctrine and committed the United States to a role of world 
leadership it now was obligated to assume. Implemented in 1947 and 1948, the Marshall 
Plan was a massive American-financed reconstruction program for war-torn Europe. At 
the time, NATO was a military alliance established in 1949 to provide a common defense 
against potential Soviet and later Communist Chinese military aggression, and it was the 
first peacetime military alliance the United States had ever joined. Truman was consumed 
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by developments in Europe and Asia, leaving Latin America by the wayside. Even so, as 
priorities go, Europe and Asia were faced with the most challenges to world peace, and 
Latin America, although in economic trouble, was in no way close to the same level of 
turmoil. Truman saw this, and devoted the United States to the development and security 
of Europe.
80
 
Focusing all of the United States money and attention on Europe and neglecting 
Latin America, Chavez believed, was a tacit reversal of Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor 
Policy.
81
 He argued, after the war, Latin American countries needed the United States 
assistance to raise their standards of living—in many ways this was a precursor to the 
Alliance for Progress mentality towards Latin America. Chavez believed, the manner in 
which the State Department dropped its Latin American friends would lead an outsider to 
believe that the countries of the Western Hemisphere were victims of a diabolical plot to 
destroy the Inter-American system. He went on to say that “[t]he Good Neighbor Policy 
was found in principle and was sound in results. It paid dividends in sympathy, in 
essential raw materials, in man power when we were fighting the Axis, and now that we 
are engaged in a cold war, it might be well for us to stop and evaluate the consequences if 
that friendship is destroyed.”82  
To shore up this friendship and create a basic level of security, Dennis Chavez 
advocated a policy of Western Hemisphere solidarity based on the Declaration of 
Principles of Inter-American Solidarity And Cooperation of 1936. In 1948, the United 
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States and other American republics came together to address solidarity and relations at 
the Bogotá Conference. During the Bogotá Conference the Union of American Republics 
was replaced with the Organization of American States. All twenty-one states were 
represented at the conference, which lasted six weeks during the months of March and 
April of 1948. This conference produced two treaties of fundamental significance in 
Western Hemispheric solidarity. The first agreement was the charter of the Organization 
of American States. The second treaty was the Treaty on Pacific Settlement, which was 
later known as the Pact of Bogotá. This treaty coordinated and unified all the prior Inter-
American treaties and declarations for the peaceful settlement of disputes among member 
states.  
Even though Secretary Marshall had promised that the United States would 
produce an economic agreement for Latin America at Bogotá a year before the 
conference, the conference failed to produce any significant economic agreements. Latin 
Americans did not just want a simple one-time handout or trade barrier manipulation—it 
desired a massive plan similar to the Marshal Plan in Europe. Latin Americans felt 
betrayed by the United States after the war. They had supplied massive amounts of 
resources for the Allied war effort and they pleaded for a program that would ensure 
economic stability similar to the Marshall plan. They argued that a stable economy in 
Latin America would dramatically extend the market for United States exports, raise the 
standard of living, and ultimately contribute to European recovery. They had a sense of 
entitlement that would never be filled. No economic program the size of the Marshal Plan 
would ever materialize. Most likely, economic consensus failed to materialize because 
the Bogotá Conference was disrupted by massive riots in the Columbian capital, which 
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nearly caused the conference to be terminated—the aftermath of which gave stark 
testimony to the unrest in Latin America during this time. 
Further unrest was present throughout Latin America. There was revolution in 
Costa Rica, rumors of the same in Chile and Ecuador—all warning signs, according to 
Dennis Chavez, of more trouble to come. Using these developments as a platform for a 
shift in foreign policy, he stated, “So long as people are ill-fed; ill-housed; ill-clad; and so 
long as there is misery, poverty, suffering and ignorance in the world, Communist 
propaganda, however false, will have appeal. The mobs in Bogotá that burned and robbed 
and killed were people who were cold and hungry.”83 He goes on to note how Latin 
America played a significant role during World War II and if Latin American ties were 
developed further this connection could be used in defense against Communism. To 
Dennis Chavez this was a natural move because Latin America and the United States 
shared tradition, heritage and geography.
84
  
After the Bogotá Conference, Dennis Chavez began to lobby the United States 
Senate to increase the resources, manpower and political strength of Latin America. Just 
as Latin American countries had opened their borders and resources during World War II, 
he felt the United States should strengthen the bonds between Latin America and shore 
up hemispheric solidarity before it was too late.
85
 In a speech given on NBC, he noted 
that even Walter Lippmann wrote that “The conference showed, so I venture to think, that 
the United States and the Latin American republics, despite all their traditional bonds, do 
not constitute a viable community in the modern world, and that their problems are 
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becoming progressively more insoluble within the confines of the Western 
Hemisphere.”86 Chavez saw economic disaster in the future for Latin America and feared 
the instability would ultimately lead to Communism taking a foothold in Latin America, 
ultimately putting the United States’ security at risk.  
Not only did Dennis Chavez fear that Communism could take hold in an 
economically poor Latin America, he was also afraid that a lack of development of their 
natural resources could also hinder the United States’ ability to stave off Communism 
throughout the world. While Congress was debating the European Recovery Program in 
1948, Dennis Chavez argued the United States should develop Latin American resources, 
especially their oil resources. During the peak recovery days of Europe there was a 
shortage of oil necessary for the rebuilding effort. Dennis Chavez chimed in and stated 
“Other countries of this continent could aid materially, not only helping us furnish 
supplies, including oil, to carry out the European Recovery Program, but could also aid 
materially in breaking the fuel shortage—all in keeping with the philosophy of the 
European recovery program and also with our boasted Good Neighbor Policy, if we mean 
it.”87 
 Specifically, Chavez wanted the United States to invest in the oil reserves in 
Mexico, instead of relying on Saudi Arabian oil. He emphatically espoused that 
neglecting the development of the Mexican oil industry was a matter of national 
security.
88
 Chavez stated in 1948, “The oil of Mexico, the oil of Columbia, the oil of 
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Venezuela, are more important to us than the oil of Saudi Arabia.”89 To him the oil in 
Mexico was relatively safe and easy to obtain during both war and peace, and the 
Russians were more likely to attack Saudi Arabia, due to proximity, than Mexico.
90
 
Because of this, Chavez argued to ensure that the United States developed the reserves in 
Mexico, despite the complicated history surrounding Mexico and the expropriation of 
United States oil company’s property in 1938. To overcome this obstacle, Dennis Chavez 
expected the American oil companies to settle for a reimbursement significantly less than 
what was actually expropriated. 
In 1949 Mexican oil production averaged 1,000,000 billion barrels (BBLs) per 
day. Even with this production, the refining capacity of Mexico was deemed inadequate 
to the point that they were forced to import lubricating oil and high-octane gasoline. At 
this time, the potential oil resources of Mexico were conservatively estimated at 
4,525,000,000 BBLs per day, and was considered the largest single source of petroleum 
in the Western Hemisphere, outside of the United States.
91
 With these facts at his 
disposal, Dennis Chavez highlighted the importance of providing Mexico with money to 
improve and increase its refining capabilities. He argued that, in the case of a war, 
Central and South America become valuable allies with Mexico City becoming a 
valuable strategic and economic center.
92
 
By the fall of 1949 the United States State Department and Mexico were heavily 
involved in negotiations over a potential loan to develop Mexico’s oil resources. During 
the negotiations Mexico claimed it needed $800,000,000 to properly build its 
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infrastructure. Already having given up $17,000,000 the United States negotiators asked 
for proof that the loan would be financially sound. Insulted by this the Mexican 
negotiators left the table. Due to the breakdown in negotiations, many claimed that this 
would give Communism a foothold in Mexico. Dennis Chavez was one of those who 
believed this and claimed that the Communists would most likely try to take advantage of 
the stalled talks for political gain. He specifically asked President Truman to take action 
to deprive the Communists of this possibility—especially at the upcoming Continental 
Congress for Peace in Mexico City.
93
  
Dennis Chavez saw danger in the stalled loan talks and emphatically spoke out 
against the American oil industry and the United States government’s unwillingness to 
compromise and reconcile the past with Mexico. In a speech delivered August 30
th
, 1949 
Dennis Chavez noted that the United States was pouring tons of money into Europe and 
ignoring Mexico who imported $5,000,000,000 a year of American goods. He blamed the 
stalled negotiations on “Big American Oil” interests. He was outraged that “Big Oil” was 
influencing the negotiations because of the expropriation of their property in 1938. 
Chavez highlighted to the Senate how the Mexican Oil industry, under Senator Bermudez 
had increased oil production to sixty million barrels a year in1948 since Mexico seized 
United States oil properties in 1938. By stalling talks, Dennis Chavez believed that the 
American Oil companies were putting their own self-interest above national security. He 
believed that having oil resources close to home instead of in Saudi Arabia made better 
                                                 
93
 New York Herald and Tribune, 9/2/1949, “Truman Heeds Threat of Reds Rally in Mexico, box 73, folder 
4, Dennis Chavez Papers, MSS 394,Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico. 
   56 
 
 
sense in terms of security.
94
 In this regard Dennis Chavez failed to see the precedent that 
ignoring the expropriation of American property would set. 
Dennis Chavez, in his criticism of the United States oil companies demand for 
proper compensation before the United States extended a loan, essentially ignored the 
history surrounding the entire situation. The expropriation of American assets by the 
Mexican government set a precedent that it was okay to seize American property and 
negotiate a less than fair price to settle the dispute. In a sense, it set the stage for Castro 
and Cuba to expropriate American property later in the century. Also, Dennis Chavez 
failed to acknowledge that the condition of the Mexican oil industry in 1949 was a direct 
result of the expropriation and a lack of funding to maintain and upgrade their 
infrastructure. Still, Dennis Chavez wholeheartedly believed that investing in the 
Mexican oil industry was essential to the security and stability of the United States.  
Chavez was able to look past the expropriation issue because he specifically 
believed that, “Mexico [was] the key to Latin America. Every Latin American country 
watches carefully how we treat our closest neighbor. They remembered how we 
welcomed raw materials, Mexican labor and Mexican troops in time of war, but how 
callously we thus far have neglected her since the fighting is over.” 95 The Mexican oil 
case was being used as a test of United States friendship and sincerity. By granting the 
loan, Chavez asserted, the United States would prove its sincerity to continue to treat 
Latin Americans as neighbors.  
Senator Chavez flew into Mexico City on October 8, 1949 and met with President 
Aleman and Senator Bermudez. The report stated that Dennis Chavez was optimistic that 
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Mexico would get the oil loan it needed.
 96
 Loan talks did eventually resume after their 
meeting and the loan was approved shortly thereafter. 
Another example of Dennis Chavez’s activities in Latin America during the post 
war years can be found in a very small incident involving Bolivian tin in 1952. Dennis 
Chavez took a stance against an agreement between Great Britain and the United States 
for the exchange of 1.4 million tons of steel in exchange for 20,000 long tons of tin in 
equal quarterly installments during 1952. Chavez believed this was an example of the 
potential harm that was being done in Latin America. With this agreement, the United 
States was to refrain from biding on tin on the London market and was to be the sole 
importer of British tin. This meant that if Bolivian tin was to be purchased by the United 
States, it must be bought at the agreed upon $1.18 per pound or the United States had to 
pay additional amounts to Great Britain. This deal, in Dennis Chavez’s mind, would ruin 
Bolivia, whose tin industry made up 70 percent of the economy.  
Like most Latin American countries, Bolivia was already experiencing tough 
economic times and there were rumors of communist agitation. Dennis Chavez insisted 
that the duty of the United States was to protect the future of Bolivia and guard against 
the collapse of its economy. Throughout the decades before World War II, Bolivia never 
produced more than 25,000 tons of tin per year. To support the Allied cause during 
World War II, Bolivians raised their production to 42,000 tons per year from a low of 
36,000 tons in 1945.
97
 Bolivia was representative of similar situations throughout Latin 
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America, and Dennis Chavez asserted, by entering this deal with Britain the United States 
was straining hemispheric solidarity. To him the United States was saying “the Latin 
America [c]ountries served their purpose (for instance, namely, furnishing materials and 
support during the war) they could now be safely cast adrift without thought for the 
morrow.” 98 Dennis Chavez was upset at Truman’s policy with Britain and felt it 
weakened the United States in the eyes of Latin America and the world. 
Dennis Chavez began speaking out about how such agreements as the one with 
Britain were drawing criticism from many Latin American republics. He pointed that the 
United States was being called imperialistic and heartless, and the very structure of Inter-
American cooperation, which the United States labored to create through the Good 
Neighbor policy, was beginning to disintegrate. Dennis Chavez was also frustrated 
because at the time of the agreement in 1952, the United States was at war with North 
Korea, and in need of tin, and yet it was boycotting Bolivian tin in favor of British tin. In 
his mind the United States was losing world prestige and key alliances
99
. In the end, 
Dennis Chavez got nowhere with his criticism of this deal, and failed to make any 
significant changes in policy. However, he did not let this deter him from focusing on 
Western Hemisphere solidarity. 
Part of his proposed solution to shore up Western Hemispheric solidarity was 
education in Latin America. Dennis Chavez believed that if the people of Latin America 
could receive even the most rudimentary education, Communism would not be able to 
take hold. He stated “For democracy to survive against dictatorship or totalitarianism, we 
must have our citizens of the world educated. An educated public is the strongest weapon 
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against inhuman and selfish individuals who want to impose their warped will on others. 
No military weapon—however devastating its power might be—can destroy the 
democratic foundation of freedom-loving spirit of an educated person.” 100 No doubt he 
was talking about nuclear weapons. Dennis Chavez asserted that every person in the 
western hemisphere deserved an elementary education at the very least. He argued that 
teachers and administrators should have the tools and money to properly educate their 
students, and the United States was in the best position to fulfill this need.
101
  
At the Inter-American Seminar on Elementary Education at the Inter-American 
Conference at Montevideo, Dennis Chavez was asked to be a keynote speaker. During his 
address, he highlighted the importance of elementary education to the security of the 
Western Hemisphere. He claimed that democracy was being tested by the propaganda of 
the enemy. The Montevideo Conference on Primary Education was an outgrowth of 
meetings held in Rio de Janerio and was the first time international experts met to study 
and attempt to remedy the Inter-American educational system that led to the existence of 
a high illiterate rate in all of the Americas. Educating the people, in Chavez’s mind, was 
one way of hindering the spread of Communism. 
Dennis Chavez did not just view economics and education as the only solution to 
stabilizing Latin America during the Post War Period—he had a small hand in military 
developments as well. One program that Dennis Chavez supported was the Mutual 
Security Program. The Mutual Security Act was initiated in 1951 to train Latin American 
military commanders in an effort to provide security for the Western Hemisphere from 
foreign powers—especially Russia. Under the act the United States negotiated military 
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agreements with twelve Latin American nations. By the end of 1959 the United States 
spent $317 million on equipment, materials, training and other assistance
102
 As part of 
this program, many Latin American countries sent military officers to the United States 
General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Visitor training began with Public 
Law 710, in June of 1938 and was started again in 1954 as a direct outgrowth of the 
Mutual Security Act. This was regarded as one of the better “Good Neighbor” programs 
and was done to “establish a closer liaison between the western hemisphere military 
personages and establish a more harmonious future relationship.”103  
Dennis Chavez being concerned with the security of the western hemisphere 
against Communism, both ideologically and militarily, supported the Mutual Security 
Program, especially when it involved the development of a missile tracking system in the 
Caribbean region. In 1957 the United States established missile tracking stations in the 
Caribbean and Latin America. Dennis Chavez often requested specifics from General F. 
Twining on the present role of the Caribbean in military matters, what each country did 
during World War II and Korea, and what they could be expected to contribute to future 
conflicts. He wanted to know who the United States negotiated assistance with and their 
contacts.
104
 His primary focus was to make sure that those countries that supported the 
Allies and NATO the most received the bulk of United States aid and support in the 
future. By the end of 1955, under the Mutual Security Program, the United States 
invested billions of dollars in direct aid and an untold amount in training and 
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development in Latin America in an effort to shore them up against Communist 
infiltration.  
Finally, one of Dennis Chavez’s most significant projects for Latin American 
stability in the Post War Era was the completion of the Pan-American Highway. He saw 
this project as integral to the defense of the western hemisphere against Communism, as 
well as an avenue to stabilizing and supporting the economies of Latin America. He 
originally supported this effort from the inception of the project in 1933. When the 
project was put aside to fight World War II he was quick to remind other senators and 
legislators of the importance of such a project. Dennis Chavez stated “I take special 
interest in Latin-American affairs, perhaps because I am of Spanish ancestry, but 
principally because I believe that a strong union of western hemisphere nations is the 
surest means of promoting international peace today. If our countries are strong 
industrially, economically, and politically, we can assure peace for the world because 
none will dare attack us.”105 
Dennis Chavez reminisced “One of my earliest dreams has been, and remains, the 
completion of an all-weather highway from the United States to the southern end of 
South America. I expect to see it a reality.” 106 When he first came to Congress there was 
no such thing as the Good Neighbor Policy. He was convinced that the Big Stick Policy 
and Dollar Diplomacy were not effective, if not a menace, to understanding Inter-
American solidarity. When Roosevelt and Hull began the Good Neighbor Policy, Dennis 
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Chavez welcomed it and encouraged it every way he could
107
. Chavez espoused that the 
construction of the Pan-American Highway was one of the surest ways to create 
understanding and goodwill in Latin America. Also, he remarked that along with these 
roads a network of radio, telegraphs and telephones would complete the union.
108
 He 
believed that the highway would bring prosperity, encourage industrialization, and bring 
about elevated standards in living and assure political and economic security.
109
 
The Pan American Highway was in no way solely a project funded by the United 
States. In 1949, it extended 3,200 miles and ran from Laredo, Texas, through Mexico, 
Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, to the Panama Canal. The 
cooperative agreement between the United States and the Latin American countries 
provided for them a two-thirds contribution from the United States, and required a one-
third contribution from the Latin American republics. 
Dennis Chavez not only viewed the highway as good for prosperity, he also 
viewed the highway system as important to the defense of the western hemisphere. 
Primarily he believed that the highway system would further relations between the United 
States and the Good Neighbors to the south. One of the most important factors in his 
support was the free exchange of persons. It was this freedom of movement that he 
believed would do more than any other single thing to promote understanding and good 
will and friendship. He regularly made trips to inspect the progress of the highway, to 
meet with foreign dignitaries and private businessmen to ensure that the road would be 
completed.  
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As a direct result of his support for the Inter-American Highway, Dennis Chavez 
was awarded the National Decoration of Vasco Nunez de Balboa, the highest award 
given by the Panamanian government to foreign persons who had done great work in 
Panama and Latin America.
110
 He was awarded this decoration because he was 
responsible for placing the proposal to continue construction of the Inter-American 
highway. The bill was passed late in 1950. He was also recognized for his active roll in 
improving relations with Latin America. In 1950, Dennis Chavez visited Panama to 
survey the area set aside for the Inter-American Highway. Also mentioned was his 
support for the establishment of air and sea bases in Latin America in 1941. Finally, he 
was recognized because in 1943 he headed a Senate Committee that studied Puerto Rico 
to improve its social and economic conditions.
111
 
During his acceptance speech he stated that the completion of the Inter-American 
highway was his “best contribution which I [Dennis Chavez] have been able to make in 
all of my public life to Hemispheric Solidarity.
112
 When presenting the National 
Decoration of the Order of Vasco Nunez de Balboa to Senator Chavez, Dr. Brin of 
Panama stated “The Government of Panama, by conferring its highest distinction upon 
this outstanding citizen of the United States of America, publicly expresses its 
appreciation of the meritorious work which he has done in the welding together of the 
various factors which forge friendship and mutual understanding between our two 
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countries. He has contributed generously to this work of effective planning by dedicating 
his ardent enthusiasm and admirable good-will to this noble cause.”113 Dr. Brin went on 
to call Dennis Chavez a fighter for American solidarity, and one who accepted the 
problems of Latin America as his, and through his work and speeches constantly 
supported a policy of positive Pan-Americanism. Dennis Chavez was inducted into the 
order with the rank of Gran Official on April 4
th
, 1951.
114
  
Dennis Chavez was honored and moved by the receipt of this award. Dr. Brin’s 
words “touched [his] heartstrings.” 115 Dennis Chavez stated “Your words, Honorable Dr. 
Brin, resound the appreciation of sincere, though modest, labor which I have been able to 
perform during the course of my parliamentary life and tend to consolidate the feeling of 
sincere understanding and loyal friendship among the nations of the Western 
Hemisphere, of this continent, which is undoubtedly, destined by God to serve as a haven 
for Western Civilization.”116 Dennis Chavez also noted that he did not work alone, and 
that other congressmen voted and pushed for the completion of the Inter-American 
highway as well. Dennis Chavez went on to say that “to connect Panama with the United 
States is a work of justice toward our nation which, in an unforgettable moment, 
permitted ours to utilize, in brotherly spirit, the entrance of the Isthmus in order to unite 
the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean.” 117 
Concerning a portion of the highway, Dennis Chavez came into contact with Luis 
Somoza, President of Nicaragua, throughout the 1950’s. Like many Latin American 
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republics in the 1950’s, Nicaragua was struggling to develop economically and 
politically. In 1956 a lone gunman killed Anastasio Somoza Garcia, leaving his sons Luis 
and Anastasio in complete control of the country. Luis had outmaneuvered or killed all 
important political opponents to his ascendancy to the presidency. He was extremely 
brutal in his tactics to the point that, “Brave and outspoken men often ended in the 
dungeon of the Presidential Palace where electrodes of the infamous ‘Little Machine’ 
were attached to their genitals for long sessions of torture.”118 With his brother, Anastasio 
in control of the National Guard, Luis Somoza was assured to maintain the status quo in 
Nicaragua. The United States had no qualms with the situation in Nicaragua at the time. 
Much of the talk of Somoza and Nicaragua in Foreign Relations of the United States 
centered around the economic situation in Nicaragua and the multiple purchases of 
United States weapons by Somoza for his country.  
 On March 11, 1955 a new law regarding foreign capital investments in Nicaragua 
became effective. The law was specifically designed to entice foreign capital to 
Nicaragua to stimulate their economy. One of the main premises of this new law was that 
foreign capital could “enter and leave the country without restrictions.”119 Article 9 of the 
law allowed for the withdrawal of foreign capital at any time. Article 14 stipulated that 
businesses established with foreign capital “will receive not less than national treatment 
under the law and will not be discriminated against with regards to labor legislation, 
taxation, or administrative measures.” 120 
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The Nicaraguan economy was predominately agricultural at this time. The GNP 
in 1955 was estimated at 1,027 million Cordobas (7 Cordobas = 1 US Dollar) with 
agriculture representing 40 percent or 416 Cordobas out of 1,027. The rest of the GNP 
was broken down across manufacturing, commerce and finance, government, mining, 
construction, transportation and communication, professional and domestic services, and 
power. Nicaragua’s major crops at this time were cotton, coffee, sesame, sugar, rice and 
beans. Cotton and coffee were by far the most important products from a foreign 
exchange perspective; exports of these two commodities accounted for 75 percent of all 
exports .
121
  
Government assistance for agriculture was concentrated in two agencies—the 
Nicaraguan Agriculture Service (STAN), a joint project of the United States Technical 
Assistance, and the National Development Institute. These agencies extended loans for 
equipment and property. Nicaragua had been traditionally dependent on the United States 
market for its exports of raw materials and its imports of manufactured goods. Even so, 
after World War II most of Nicaraguan cotton and coffee was sold to Western Europe 
and Japan cutting exports to the United States from 70 percent down to 37 percent. 
Consequently imports from the United States had decreased from 81 percent to 65 
percent by 1950.  
Still, the oldest and most important force behind economic development in 
Nicaragua was the United States—specifically the programs such as STAN, which was a 
joint project of Point IV and the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock. By June of 1956 
the United States government contributed $1,371,000 to technical assistance programs in 
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Nicaragua. Also, the United States appropriated through its Bureau of Public Roads $7.5 
million for the construction of the Nicaraguan stretch of the Inter-American Highway. In 
addition to this the United States had also appropriated another $7.5 million and budgeted 
another $4 million for the construction of the Rama Road from Managua to the Atlantic, 
which was being done entirely by United States dollars.   
 Nicaragua was one of the largest Central American countries occupying 57,000 
square miles with a population of 1,203,113 people in 1957. It had a centralized 
republican form of government, with an elected president and a bicameral legislative 
branch. In 1950 a new constitution was enacted that allowed for “proportional 
representation in both elective and appointive positions”122 In 1956 there were two legal 
political parties consisting of The National Liberals and the Conservatives both 
competing for the presidential seat in February of 1957.
123
 Shortly after the assassination 
of Anastasio Somoza Garcia in 1956, his son Luis Somoza had consolidated power and 
held elections in 1957. 
The presidential election on February 3, 1957 resulted in the predicted election of 
Luis Somoza essentially assuring that Nicaraguan economic policies would not change. 
However, the coffee crop was damaged by un-seasonal rains and together with lagging 
sales in the cotton industry there was cause for concern with regards to exchange earnings 
and balance of payments. Most reports that came out during this time revealed that crops 
still under cultivation were still in excellent condition offsetting the losses projected in 
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cotton and coffee. Retail activity was down, new loans being taken out were down, and 
vegetable oil exports decreased because of increased competition from El Salvador.
124
 
It is at this time that Dennis Chavez became involved with the development of 
Nicaragua’s economy. He initially began his support for Nicaragua with his efforts 
towards the completion of the Pan American Highway, but soon became involved in 
specific projects to improve the economic situation in Nicaragua. For instance, on April 
29
th 
1957 he wrote a letter to the Assistant Director of Operations for the Western 
Hemisphere Division of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBCRD), Frederico Consolo, inquiring about financial assistance for the cotton seed oil 
mill project in Nicaragua. He was ultimately referred to the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) because the IBCRD required a governmental guarantee, where as the 
IFC did not.
125
 Dennis Chavez was ultimately successful in securing financing for this 
project.  
Dennis Chavez’s interest in the economic situation in Nicaragua eventually 
gained him the attention and respect of President Luis Somoza, and they regularly 
corresponded. Their first communiqué was on May 2, 1957. Dennis Chavez wrote to 
thank Somoza for the courtesies that were extended to his assistant Charles Davis, and 
two American businessmen Manuel Caballero and Frank Jerome. By all indications in 
this letter, it seemed that Caballero and Jerome were seeking to invest in Nicaragua. 
Dennis Chavez wrote “Both Mr. Caballero and Mr. Jerome are financially responsible 
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and highly respected in their community. I feel that their visit to Nicaragua will prove 
productive, not only to them, but also to your country.” 126  
On June 11, 1957 Dennis Chavez wrote to Somoza congratulating him on his 
method of handling a dispute between Rosendo Arguello Jr. and Frank Jerome over 
commitments made and not honored by Arguello in regards to scrap iron. The letter 
indicated that Arguello made some rash commitments he could not honor. Major Garcia 
of Nicaragua was forced to make himself personally responsible for these debts to keep 
foreign investment coming into the country. Dennis Chavez wrote to Somoza to get him 
to pursue the issue and “stop Arguello from making other commitments to any other 
purchasers of scrap iron in other countries. By this, I infer that my constituents do not 
care who he sells the scrap iron to, but we do not want him to get himself in a bind where 
he has taken money or monies to further increase his present obligations.” 127 In this same 
letter he indicated that Mr. Jerome would be submitting a proposal on the cotton seed oil 
mill and would be in Nicaragua in the next 30 days.
128
 
The dispute between Arguello and Jerome popped up again when an agreement 
between Jerome and Promotora Industrial Nicaraguense occurred. Jerome was to receive 
six dollars per ton on all of Promotora Industrial Nicaraguense steel shipped from 
Managua. In October of 1957, 3,000 tons of steel was shipped from Nicaragua without 
the payment being made to Jerome. Instead the money was paid to Garcia, Merlin Teskey 
(who had supposedly replaced Mr. Jerome in the deal without any consultation), and Mr. 
                                                 
126
 Dennis Chavez to Somosa, May 2, 1957,box 43, file 11, Dennis Chavez Papers, MSS 394,Center for 
Southwest Research, University of New Mexico.   
127
 Dennis Chavez to Somosa, May 2, 1957.  
128
 Ibid. 
   70 
 
 
Arguello. Mr Teskey received approximately $44,000, Arguello received $23,000, and 
Major Garcia received $29,000.  
 Being that Senator Chavez introduced Jerome to Somoza, he took a personal 
interest in seeing that this dispute was handled fairly. Dennis Chavez wrote to Somoza, 
“if the Government of Nicaragua is not going to intervene and see to it that without delay 
restitution is made to the American investor, to whom guarantees have been made by 
responsible Nicaraguan citizens and assurances given by the Nicaraguan government, I 
could no longer in good conscience recommend to any American investor that he make 
any new investments in Nicaragua.”129 Chavez demanded that the $18,000.00 be paid to 
Jerome as soon as possible, a meeting arranged between Arguello and Jerome, plus the 
government of Nicaragua should enter into negotiations with Jerome to replace 
Promotora Industrial Nicarguense and associates for the purchase of scrap steel. Dennis 
Chavez was very deeply disturbed by this matter and hoped that Somoza would rectify it 
to the best of his ability. 
130
 By December 4, 1957 the matter was not resolved and Dennis 
Chavez was set to call Somoza at six o’clock in the evening that day.131 
 On December 19, 1957, Dennis Chavez communicated to Somoza that Arguello 
was willing to work with Jerome to satisfy the debt. However, Jerome refused to work 
with Arguello due to his past experience with him. Instead he wanted to work out a deal 
with the government of Nicaragua.
132
 Unfortunately, other senators had begun to question 
Dennis Chavez on this matter causing significant embarrassment. Apparently Senator 
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Javits from New York, Senator Yarborough of Texas, and Senator Kuchel of California 
all wanted to know the status of the situation.
133
 Chavez recommended that Somoza meet 
with the parties to work out a deal. Chavez reminded Somoza that it was “extremely 
important to your country that the stability of commercial transactions between the 
citizens of the United States and your country be maintained at all times…the political 
ramifications to your country could be serious should some Senator or Congressman want 
to insert a statement concerning this transaction in the Congressional Record.”134 
 Somoza replied to Chavez on January 10
th
, 1958 with a denial of governmental 
responsibility. He acted with surprise that Mr. Jerome considered that his business 
transaction with Promotora Industrial Nicarguense had anything to do with the 
government of Nicaragua. He wrote, “This unreasonable belief is to be lamented 
moreover thru the un-just opinion that could arise among the distinguished and 
appreciated Senators mentioned in your letter.”135 He also expressed that Mr. Jerome 
should have been more careful with whom he did business. He should have obtained 
better information on the people he conducted his business with beforehand. He hoped 
that all who knew about this matter would be correctly informed that neither the 
government of Nicaragua nor Somoza himself had anything to do with the transaction. 
Even so, Somoza informed Chavez that if Jerome came to Nicaragua he would be treated 
very well and be given the correct procedure to ensure that his rights are upheld.
136
 Mr. 
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Jerome did not make it to Nicaragua because of an illness he contracted while in Mexico 
City. He did meet with Arguello beforehand, but without any results.  
Somoza was a brutal dictator that ruled by force, corruption, and the limitation of 
civil liberties. For instance, during the election of 1957 the Conservative Party refused to 
participate in the election in protest. Somoza created a fake party called the National 
Conservative Party to give the election a democratic façade. Luis Somoza of course won 
the election in 1957 with very little effort. Even with this façade, the United States 
regarded Somoza and Nicaragua among one of its allies. Somoza was a key player in the 
creation of the Central American Common Market, and a strong supporter of the Alliance 
for progress. He also allowed the CIA supported Cuban rebels to launch the Bay of Pigs 
Invasion from Puerto Cabezas on the Nicaraguan Coast. 
Despite the corruption, Chavez’s interaction with Somoza is an example of his 
intentional rapport with leaders in Latin America and his interest to ensure that United 
States interests were secure and American investors treated fairly. By his letters to 
Somoza it is obvious that Dennis Chavez regarded Somoza as a friend and associate. 
Chavez wrote to Somoza in this matter and others because he knew that Somoza would 
listen. So, what began as interest in the Nicaraguan stretch of the Pan-American 
Highway, soon led Chavez to involvement in the economic affairs of the country and 
friendship with its leader. 
As the world moved past the destruction and chaos of World War II, the United 
States was once again at the top of its economic and military strength. The United States 
had demonstrated that it had the technology and will to win at all costs. A large part of 
that success was due to the support given by many Latin American countries, which often 
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sold natural resources at below market costs in the hopes of reaping the rewards after the 
war. Their reward never came as expected. Many of the Latin America republics saw 
their economies crumble after the demand for their goods fell after the war. Dennis 
Chavez saw the state of Latin America as a potential breeding ground for Communism. 
To combat this development he pushed for further investment in Latin America both 
economically and militarily. In doing so, he often put himself in opposition to the goals 
of the Marshall Plan for Europe, which he saw as foolhardy and risky. He angrily stated 
that “Our obligation to Europe is far less than to our Central American neighbors. These 
countries stood steadily by us during the war for a United Western Hemisphere.”137  It 
seemed that most of his words fell on deaf ears, as Latin America never saw an effort 
even close to the Marshall Plan until the development of the Alliance for Progress in the 
1960s. Dennis Chavez nonetheless was admired and rewarded for his efforts to develop 
and ease the plight of Latin America.  
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Chapter Four 
Chavez and Perón 
 
Dennis Chavez’s impact on Latin American foreign relations may have been 
minimal overall, but in some cases, Dennis Chavez found himself in the company of 
some of Latin America’s most controversial personalities. While Chavez was admired 
and rewarded for his involvement in Latin America, his actions were also viewed as 
suspicious and controversial in the case of Argentina. In this chapter, I will explore one 
of the most controversial and perplexing events for Dennis Chavez in Latin America; his 
support for Juan D. Perón of Argentina. Why did he support this leader when, “U.S. 
leaders regarded Perón as an unreconstructed pro-fascist and mounted a determined 
campaign against him?” 138 
Beginning with the Argentine Revolution in 1943 it became clear that there were 
fundamental differences between the United States and Argentina. The United States 
State Department watched as Argentina went through governments like a chameleon 
changes its color—matching its outer appearance to suit the pressures from within and 
the pressures from outside eventually settling on Juan D. Perón in 1946. It is well 
documented that Argentina was a source of irritation to the United States throughout 
World War II and during the immediate post war period. Juan D. Perón ruled with an iron 
fist and caused significant friction with the United States and other Latin American 
countries. Despite the tension that Perón caused, Dennis Chavez espoused closer relations 
with Argentina, stating that Perón was not as bad as he was made out to be, and thus was 
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invited several times to visit Perón in Argentina. There are multiple reasons why Dennis 
Chavez would support Perón when others did not, but the most likely was Perón’s 
support for the middle and lower classes over that of the rich oligarchs, a position often 
taken by Dennis Chavez himself. 
Dennis Chavez truly was at odds with American policy, not just in words, but also 
in action. He spoke out in support of Argentina when others did not. During a time when 
Argentina was a thorn in the United States side, Chavez took many trips to visit with the 
Argentine President, supported them at the Mexico Conference of 1946, and became 
involved in the appointment of one of Argentina’s statesmen. The reasons why he chose 
to support Perón and Argentina are not clear. I believe Chavez saw Perón as a progressive 
Hispanic leader that used the power of the labor organizations to push his agenda. In 
other words, Perón admired him for developing Argentina socially and politically.   
Most of the tension between Argentina and the United States centered on broken 
promises surrounding the severing of ties with Germany during World War II. It is here 
that Cordell Hull, then Secretary of State, grew suspicious and calculative towards Perón 
and Argentina. Despite the fact that most Latin American countries supported the Allied 
cause, Argentina had been linked to covert support of the Bolivian Revolution and 
accused of conspiring with Axis agents in subversive activities. In the face of 
overwhelming pressure from the United States and other Latin American republics, the 
Argentine government eventually broke relations with Germany in an effort to repair 
what relations it had left in the Americas. Still Argentine’s break with Germany was 
naturally viewed with much skepticism. This skepticism was reinforced when on 
February 19, 1944, Farrel and Perón led a coup. It is generally accepted that from this 
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coup that Perón was in essential control of the country—pulling the strings from behind 
the scenes. Many years after the coup, Perón was “elected” to the presidency and the 
seats of true power in Argentina. Dennis Chavez ignored the general distrust of Perón and 
on several occasions supported him in the face of public scrutiny.  
The Argentine Revolution of 1943 brought about fundamental differences 
between the United States and Argentina.  President Ramon S. Castillo refused to sever 
relations with the Axis powers in accordance with the recommendations of the Rio de 
Janeiro Conference, pushing the United States to become ever more impatient.
139
 By 
1943 Castillo was overthrown by a military junta led by Pedro P. Ramirez and Arturo 
Rawson. At first glance it looked as if the new government would adopt a pro-United 
Nations policy, due in large part to public statements made by Rawson and Ramirez. For 
instance, President Ramirez announced that the Argentine government reaffirmed “its 
traditional policy of friendship and loyal cooperation with the other nations of America in 
conformity with existing pacts.”140 Such statements prompted the United States to 
recognize the Ramirez government on June 11, 1943. 
Unfortunately many of the promises espoused by the Ramirez regime never 
materialized. Ramirez did not break ties with the Axis powers. This was partly due to 
divisions present in the Ramirez regime. Ramirez and several other moderates were 
opposed by a group of junior officers who were members of the nationalistic, Pro-Fascist 
organization called the Grupo de Oficiales Unidos (GOU). Juan D. Perón was a 
prominent member of the GOU and was appointed as the Under-Secretary of War as well 
as Director of the National Labor Bureau at this time. While in these positions he 
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espoused a pro-Axis position. Perón also often spoke out against the United States and its 
pressure to affect change in Argentina. He stated that the “international position of 
Argentina will not be altered by pressure exercised by capital or investments of any 
foreign country,” no doubt making reference to Cordell Hull’s proposition to provide 
airplanes, parts, machinery and armaments to restore Argentina to so-called equilibrium 
with other Latin American countries.
141
  
Things became more complex when a revolution in Bolivia overturned the 
government of President Penaranda on December 20
th
 1943 and installed Major 
Gualberto Villarroel. There were strong indications that German and Argentine agents 
operating from within Argentina had engineered the revolution.
142
 A few days after the 
Bolivian revolt the Inter-American Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense 
at Montevideo declared that recognition should be withheld from any new American 
government that was brought about through force during wartime until it could be 
determined whether the new regime would comply with Inter-American commitments for 
the defense of the hemisphere.
143
  
Unfortunately, evidence accumulated that Argentine officials had been involved 
in the overthrow of the Bolivian government, straining relations even more. The United 
States had uncovered detailed knowledge connecting Argentine nationalists with the 
Bolivian revolution. Also, there were the revelations that came out of the capture of 
German agent Osmar Hellmuth in Trinidad by British agents. Hellmuth revealed that he 
was a go-between for members of the German and Argentine governments as the 
Ramirez regime sought arms and technicians from Germany. With the Hellmuth case, 
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Argentine officials could no longer deny involvement in Bolivia’s revolution. To save 
face, in 1944, Ramirez and Foreign Minister Gilbert severed relations with Germany and 
Japan stating, “the Federal Police had uncovered a vast espionage network detrimental to 
friendly powers; that the Axis governments had been directly responsible for these 
criminal activities.”144 
Shortly after, on February 15, 1944, a group of comparatively junior officers took 
control of the Foreign Ministry, ousted President Ramirez and installed General Edelmiro 
Farrell. The coup was the work of a military clique purported to be more pro-Axis than 
Ramirez. These officers, of whom Juan Perón was one, were upset by Ramirez’s break in 
relations with the Axis and feared he might go further and actually declare war against 
Germany and Japan.
145
  
 Needless to say the United States viewed this development with a watchful eye 
and refused to enter into official relations with the Farrell government. As the year 
progressed toward spring the United States became more and more alarmed by 
Argentina’s outward antagonism toward the United States and other American republics, 
and their aid and sympathy for the Axis powers. The Farrell regime gave Axis diplomats 
the run of the country, set free Axis spies detained by Ramirez, gave large official 
contracts to Axis firms, and supported a string of pro-Axis newspapers.
146
  
On October 27, 1944 the Argentine government called for a conference of 
American Foreign Ministers. Argentina had the right to call this conference as a member 
of the Pan American Union and the Farrell regime knew it would have been impossible 
for the American nations to have a conference without recognizing the new Argentine 
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leadership. This was a shrewd move by the Farrell regime to gain recognition.
147
 The 
Governing Board of the Pan American Union decided to stall the proposal claiming that 
there were an insufficient number of replies by the members. Furthermore, there were 
plans to hold a conference in 1945 to discuss post-war problems, both economic and 
political, so why have a special session. On January 8
th
, 1945 Secretary Stettinius 
announced that the Pan-American Union had indefinitely deferred Argentina’s request for 
a conference and they would not be invited to the Inter-American Conference on 
Problems of War and Peace in Mexico.  
As a result of not being invited to the Mexico conference, the Argentine 
government made some minor concessions in hopes of gaining consideration. For 
instance, they promised to hold early elections and to reinstate democratically minded 
professors who had been banned. The Farrell government also suspended pro-Axis dailies 
such as Cabildo and El Pampero. Furthermore, they showed some signs that they might 
declare war on Germany. For instance, “Several days before the Mexico conference 
convened, the Argentine Foreign Ministry released the text of a note to the German 
Foreign Office protesting the Nazis’ ‘threat’ to deny safe conduct to several Argentine 
diplomats in Sweden.”148 This note suggested that Argentina’s “patience and good will 
had been put to a severe strain.”149  
Shortly after the release of this document, unfortunately, Perón emphatically 
restated Argentina’s position when he released a general statement to the press. He stated, 
“You must not demand that we go to war against anybody…A declaration of war against 
Germany, out of the blue or on grounds palpably insufficient, tardily recognized and 
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opportunistic, would alienate our friends in this country and the other American republics 
and give our foes an opportunity to heap scorn upon us.”150 Of course Perón did not 
anticipate the hope offered Argentina at the Mexico City conference. The final resolution 
of the conference declared that it hoped that Argentina would cooperate with the other 
American republics in order to be incorporated into the United Nations.
151
 On March 27, 
1945 President Farrell announced that Argentina was in a state of war with Germany and 
Japan, and that it would adhere to the Final Act of the Mexico City conference.
152
 As a 
result, Argentina was recognized on April 9, 1945 by the United States and other 
American republics.  
Even after being recognized, Perón still found ways to antagonize the United 
States. For instance, on July 19, 1945 the streets of Buenos Aries were flooded with 
handbills personally attacking the character of United States Ambassador Braden. One 
handbill stated that “Cowboy Braden” had turned his eye to Argentina after his success in 
Cuba and Guatemala. Another declared that Washington and Lincoln would not have sent 
“Cowboy Braden” to tamper with the governments of Latin America. A third compared 
Braden to Al Capone! The fourth and final handbill stated that Braden planned to “tame” 
Argentina in one month.
153
 Braden suspected, and  later confirmed, that Perón was behind 
the handbills in a letter to Secretary of State James Byrnes, dated July 24, 1945. Much to 
Perón’s chagrin, prominent representatives of the Argentine labor unions sprang to 
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Braden’s aid. They denounced the dissemination of the leaflets and pushed for further 
strengthening of economic relations with the United States.
154
 
As much as Perón felt that he had control in Argentina, by October 1945, 
Argentina was in political turmoil once again. On the 9
th
 of October a coup led from 
within the army resulted in Farrell’s and Perón’s temporary removal from power and 
their imprisonment. The new military leadership was unable to rally the civilian 
politicians and core to their cause. Six days after the coup, a group of civilian workers, 
led by Cipriano Reyes, descended upon the capitol forcing the military led coup to 
relinquish control. On October 16
th
, Perón and Farrell were released from prison and 
restored to power. Although Perón was not restored to any of his offices, it is generally 
accepted that from this point in time he was essentially in full control of the 
government.
155
  
Shortly after the restoration of the Farrell regime a campaign to elect a 
Constitutional President was launched. Perón immediately announced that he was 
running, even though he did not represent a political party. To circumvent this, Perón 
organized three new groups. The largest was called the Partido Laborista, which 
consisted of most of the leaders of the country’s trade unions. This party won the 
majority of both houses at the close of the election.
156
 The other two parties that rallied 
behind Perón were the Renovated Radical Party and the Independent Party. These two 
helped Perón win the election, however, not on the same scale as the Partido Laborista. 
The campaign was hectic, with the candidates being shot at several times, and resulted in 
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the election of Perón. On June 4, 1946, Perón was inaugurated as the Constitutional 
President of Argentina, beginning a long and repressive reign.
157
  
The news of Perón’s eventual election did little to change the United States 
position on Argentina. Even though Perón had committed grave sins in the light of World 
War II, the policy of recognition depended upon adherence to prior agreements. On 
March 7
th
 1947, just before Perón was elected to the Presidency, Ambassador John Moors 
Cabot, the chargé d’affaires in Argentina, wrote to Secretary Acheson to air possible 
considerations regarding the inevitable election of Perón. The first consideration outlined 
that it was not the tradition of the United States to oppose a democratically elected 
government. Secondly, Cabot stated that, despite the presence of violence and oppression 
before the election, the “Voting procedure and counting of ballots have unquestionably 
been the fairest in Argentine history”158 With that said, Cabot argued that there was no 
reason to doubt that Perón was the choice of the Argentine people. Based on that, he said 
that it would not behoove the United States to attempt to remove a government chosen by 
the Argentines, and that “we must accept [the] verdict of [the] Argentine people and 
maintain relations with their chosen [government], [as] unsatisfactory to the United States 
though it may be.”159 Furthermore, Cabot acknowledged that Perón’s ascendancy to the 
presidency in no way nullified his connivance with the Nazis in the face of United States 
pressure. Even so, Cabot asserted that what Perón had done in the past should be only one 
of the criteria concerning further relations with Argentina. Instead, the United States 
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should focus on what Perón will be expected to do in the future.
160
 He recommended that 
the United States continue to put pressure on Argentina to live up to its commitments of 
the Rio and Mexico resolutions. Finally, Cabot recommended that Argentina’s 
compliance and progress towards honoring these commitments should be the sole basis 
on which United States aid to Argentina be determined. 
Secretary Byrnes wrote to all of the diplomatic representatives in the American 
republics that the United States would not sever relations with Argentina upon the 
election of Perón.
161
 Furthermore, if the question of severing diplomatic relations with the 
Perón regime arose it would be decided in consultation with the other American 
republics, and that the United States had no intention of acting unilaterally.
162
 The United 
States would, however, still refuse to sign a military treaty with any Argentine 
government controlled by elements that had conspired with enemies of the United States. 
In other words, the United States would not be selling arms to the Argentine government 
because of Perón’s link to Nazi Germany.163 This was evidence of the general lack of 
trust that Byrnes had for Perón and other factions within Argentina, for he was not about 
to strengthen those forces militarily that had openly opposed the United States. 
Even though Perón was democratically elected, the United States and many Latin 
American countries did not trust Perón or his new regime. They believed, in fact, that the 
Argentine government had not lived up to her obligations even after declaring war on the 
Axis powers. Because of this the American members of the International Labor 
Organization would not accept the Argentine delegates at the Mexico Conference in April 
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of 1946. Just before the Conference, on April 1, the United States State Department 
expressed its viewpoint that Argentina had not lived up to her obligations and therefore 
should not have a seat on any of the committees. Many of the Foreign Ministers agreed 
with the United States viewpoint with very few exceptions.
164
  
 With the credentials of the Argentine delegates sure to be challenged the State 
Department laid out some very specific guidelines for its delegates. The Senior United 
States delegates to the conference were Senator Chavez, and Verne Zimmer of the 
Division of Labor Standards of the Department of State. Also in attendance for the 
United States was, David Zellerbach and George Meany of the American Federation of 
Labor. These delegates were specifically told by the State Department not to raise the 
question of Argentina’s delegates’ right to be seated at the conference, and they should 
only “state that credentials requirements are governed by the terms of the ILO 
Constitution.”165 Also, the delegates were instructed to stay off any committee that would 
be required to pass on the Argentine credentials.  
 As the United States delegates were preparing to leave for the conference, Senator 
Chavez reiterated that the United States delegates should not raise any question about the 
Argentine delegation, that he hoped that no one else would raise the question, and the 
United States delegates should stay out of any discussion of the matter.
166
 Mr. George 
Meany, United States Workers delegate, expressed that he had reservations about the 
seating of the Argentine labor representatives in the Workers Group. Senator Chavez 
restated in firm terms that the United States government should not raise any question 
about the Argentine delegation but indicated that the United States, in fact, should adopt a 
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friendly attitude towards Argentina—a complete reversal of the stated policy of the 
United States State Department. Ironically at the first meeting of the Selection 
Committee, Senator Chavez raised the Argentine question through a misunderstanding of 
the procedure, while expressing a very pro-Argentine attitude.
167
 
 The Worker Group at the conference decided to expel the Argentine Workers 
Delegation from its meetings, and refused to elect any Argentine Workers delegate to any 
committee at the conference. The Secretary General, Mr. Edward J. Phelan, explained 
that neither the Selection Committee nor the Conference in Plenary session had the 
authority to approve or disapprove credentials in absence of a formal protest. The 
committee therefore unanimously resolved that it had accepted the credentials of all 
delegations.
168
 Mr. Meany replied to that decision with a very strong statement 
expressing to the Argentine delegates that the action of the Workers Group in expelling 
them from their meeting and refusing to elect them to committees was not an idle or 
frivolous gesture. He felt that he had an obligation to the free-trade movement in 
Argentina, whose members had been imprisoned or expelled from the country. One of the 
Argentine delegates, Dr. Riguera, attempted to respond to Mr. Meany, but Senator 
Chavez motioned for the meeting to adjourn—a clear move to prevent further attacks on 
Argentina.
169
 After a heated debate over this incident and the issue of discrimination 
towards Panamanian laborers around the Canal Zone, Dennis Chavez was replaced at the 
conference by Bernard Weisman of the United States State Department labor section.
170
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 Dennis Chavez’s support for Argentina did not end at the conference. During a 
speech delivered in Mexico City on December 3, 1946, Dennis Chavez stated that even 
though Argentina had been bracketed as a “problem nation,” they could benefit from a 
return to the Good Neighbor Policy. It seemed as if Chavez was extending an olive 
branch to the Argentine Republic, however, the Argentine delegates walked out of the 
assembly and stated that Chavez’s remarks were unsuitable. In the same breath, the 
Argentine delegates professed that Chavez’s statement was “unimportant because 
‘nothing and nobody’ could divert Argentine representatives from the ‘democratic ideals 
that they represent through the free and authentic will of the Argentine people’”171 It 
appeared that the Argentines were not accepting Chavez’s offer of help. Even so, 
Argentina still welcomed him and other Congressmen in December of 1948, during 
which, in the words of Pete Jarman, Democrat from Alabama, they had a “good bull 
session.” After this meeting the delegation left Buenos Aries for Montevideo, except for 
Dennis Chavez who remained a few more weeks.
172
 During his stay, Dennis Chavez was 
received several times by President Perón and had numerous discussions about the state 
of Argentina.  
In a statement made to American correspondents at a conference in Argentina, he 
espoused that he did not think “things are as bad as intimated in many quarters.”173 He 
claims to have come to this conclusion through contact with taxi drivers, waiters, clerks, 
elevator operators and American businessmen. He asserted that he found no real criticism 
of the Perón regime, except from oligarchs. Dennis Chavez even espoused that he 
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believed Perón was trying to follow Roosevelt in New Deal social legislation.
174
 He even 
asserted that in the international community, Argentina impressed him by their complete 
agreement to fight against Communism. Dennis Chavez was also linked to the 
controversial removal of Miguel Miranda as Argentina’s economic czar. During a dinner 
on December 22, 1948 Miranda was said to be criticizing Juan Perón and his policies to 
Dennis Chavez, who thought it was an “unconscionable performance.”175 Dennis Chavez 
eventually discussed this with Ambassador Bruce, who through a private intermediary 
informed Perón. By January 19
th
 Miranda was forced to resign. 
In the years following these incidents Dennis Chavez made numerous trips to 
Argentina. In 1948, he was invited to Argentina by Ambassador Bruce. During one of the 
visits he met with President Perón and several leading businessmen. One business 
venture Dennis Chavez dealt with was the Moore & McCormack Boat Company. This 
company wanted to make cruise liners that would run to many of the countries in Latin 
America, including Argentina. Argentina stood to be one of the major destinations for 
many American tourists, and would benefit economically. Also, on this visit, Dennis 
Chavez met with Alberto Dodero, a wealthy businessman in Argentina, and owner of the 
Compañía Argentina de Navegación Dodero.
176
 This company began regular cruises 
from Buenos Aires to London in 1949 with the newly christened liner called Presedente 
Perón named after President Perón. The following year Compañía Argentina de 
Navegación Dodero launched the Eva Perón and the 17 De Octubre. Also during that 
year the company expanded its services to Vigo, Amsterdam and Hamburg. Dennis 
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Chavez regularly took vacations in Buenos Aries and Ambassador Bruce regularly made 
travel arrangements for him.
177
 Many of these trips were set up through Compañía 
Argentina de Navegación Dodero, at the suggestion of Ambassador Bruce.
178
 
During some of these trips, Dennis Chavez was asked to speak to high level 
government officials in regards to financial dealings. For instance, New York financier, 
Ambrose Hartnett, made an offer to the Argentine government through Dennis Chavez. 
Hartnett offered them a credit against German claims of indebtedness in the amount of 
$4,959,777.09. This dollar amount was the United States dollar indebtedness of German 
banks to his American organization.
179
 The proposal was taken into consideration by 
high-level authorities in Argentina, but it was felt that the offer did not take into account 
the debt owed to Argentina by the German people. Because of this, it was uncertain if 
Hartnett’s offer was in favor of Argentina or Germany.180 There is no evidence that a deal 
was ever struck between Hartnett and the Argentine Government. 
Dennis Chavez’s support and dealings with the Perón government drew a 
watchful eye from President Truman. In 1949 President Truman asked Ambassador 
Bruce to brief him on one of Dennis Chavez’s visits to Argentina. Bruce described 
Dennis Chavez’s last trip to Argentina in a very superficial way. He described how he 
regularly met with President Perón and other members of his government. For instance, 
during the trip in question, he met for five hours with President Perón. The content of that 
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meeting is not known, but illustrates the level of involvement Chavez had with a 
government that was often times frustrated with the American government. Bruce also 
stated that one of the best assets Dennis Chavez brought with regards to the Latin 
American people was the fact that he spoke Spanish and his Spanish background. He also 
tells how Dennis Chavez was immediately accepted in Buenos Aries as one of their own. 
By all accounts, James Bruce stated that this trip was a success.
181
 
While Dennis Chavez’s support for the Argentine government is perplexing and 
generally inconsistent with the stated policy of the United States Government, there is 
little evidence that he was involved in anything nefarious. 
It is possible that Dennis Chavez was attempting to get close to Perón to help the 
State Department keep tabs on Perón. With Dennis Chavez’s track record of being a 
strong supporter of Latin American republics, his ability to speak Spanish, and his 
Spanish heritage, it was likely that Perón would trust him. Taking this viewpoint, Dennis 
Chavez’s actions at the ILO conference, the removal of Miranda, and the numerous 
speeches of support represent an effort to show Perón that Dennis Chavez was on his side 
and every meeting with Perón was an information gathering session. However secretive 
this hypothesis is, it is not supported by any documentary evidence, and must remain a 
hypothetical.  
What is more likely is that Dennis Chavez and Perón shared a common link to the 
major labor movements of the time. While Perón used labor to ensure and sustain his rise 
to power, Dennis Chavez was a strong supporter of worker’s rights and often championed 
the little guy in the face of a big government. His support for labor went all the way back 
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to his boyhood job as a grocery delivery boy in Albuquerque, New Mexico. This first job 
was with Charles Conroy, owner of the Highland Grocery store on South Arno Street. 
Chavez would work thirteen hours a day, Monday through Friday, delivering groceries to 
various households. In 1903, railroad workers went on strike in protest of the Santa Fe 
Rail Road. During this strike, Dennis Chavez was ordered by his employer to deliver 
groceries to those who were working as strike breakers. He refused to do so and lost his 
job for his stand, but made a statement for what he believed in.
182
 
 After completing his law degree at Georgetown University, Dennis Chavez 
returned to Albuquerque to set up practice. He became a lawyer working out of the 
Whiting Building, Dennis Chavez set up a very lucrative practice, becoming “the attorney 
of choice” for many Albuquerque Hispanos. In 1922, Dennis Chavez defended two 
railroad workers who had been arrested for “assault by word” and “serious injury”.183 He 
also fought to remove the injunction blocking the strike. Little is known about the 
outcome of his legal case, but the federal injunction issued during the railroad strike had a 
profound affect on Chavez. As a Congressman he voted to enact the Norris-La Guardia 
Anti Injunction Bill which prohibited the federal judiciary from interfering with the right 
of labor to strike.
184
 The act essentially established the full freedom of the worker to form 
labor unions without employer interference and the right for the federal government to 
interfere in labor disputes. 
 Dennis Chavez was also accessible to many labor unions needing his help—even 
if it was just a phone call to start an investigation. For instance, in December of 1939 the 
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United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America wrote Dennis Chavez about 
the “beating down” of wages and working conditions on the F.H.A. projects in 
Albuquerque, New Mexico. The builders who had won the contracts from the F.H.A. 
were paying carpenters well below the established wage recognized as fair by the state 
and federal labor department. They wanted Dennis Chavez to launch an immediate 
investigation into the matter. Dennis Chavez, who always professed that he was 100 
percent on labor’s side, expressed regret of these conditions, and asked for a complete 
and thorough investigation into the matter. He then forwarded this request to Mr. Stewart 
McDonald, administrator Federal Housing Administration. 
For his work with labor, Dennis Chavez was lauded as a fighter for the common 
man when the country needed it most. Dennis Chavez was a long time friend and 
advocate of the small time farmer. He supported the expansion of the Agriculture 
Adjustment Act and the Farm Labor Tenant Bill. The Labor Tenant Bill was aimed at 
correcting the displacement of many landless farmers created by the reduction crops 
dictated by the AAA. It provided long term, low interest loans to tenant farmers and 
sharecroppers. Dennis Chavez was a joint sponsor of legislation related to this relief 
effort.
185
 He was also a strong supporter of most of the major relief and reform efforts of 
the New Deal era like the AAA, WPA, PWA, CCC, and the Social Security and Wagner 
Act.
186
 Chavez’s strong ties to labor-oriented issues allowed him to meet Perón on 
common ground. 
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Robert J Alexander, Professor of Economics at Rutgers University, argues that 
Perón used the labor organization existing in Argentina in 1943 to ultimately boost him 
into power.
187
 Perón was successful in gaining control of the top leadership of the labor 
movement and using them to create one of the great centers of power in Argentina’s 
social, economic, and political structure. The revolution that ultimately led to his rise to 
power was motivated more by the army’s fear of a pro-Allied government coming to 
power during WW II, than by social and political discontent. Political discontent was 
brought on by the dissolving of Congress and the suppression of the Confederacion 
General De Trabajo, or the CGT. Congress was dissolved because it was under the 
control of radical Socialist parties and the center of democratic pro-Allied agitation. The 
military regime also suppressed the CGT on the grounds that it was Communist 
dominated and removed from power the leaders of the country’s labor organizations 
placing military officers in charge.
188
 By September of 1943 there were widespread 
demonstrations of discontent across the country. Even a number of retired Generals and 
Admirals called for the restoration of a constitutional government. The younger members 
of the military group that seized power saw that the regime was heading towards 
becoming a violent dictatorship, and would be short lived if it did not have the support 
from civilian elements. 
The first move of the regime was to attempt to win over the industrial middle 
class who had been discontent with the landowner-dominated governments of the past. 
The problem was that the industrial middle class had traditionally supported the Union 
Civica Radical, which ultimately wanted the return of a constitutional government. 
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Without a constitutional government in place, the industrialists would not consider an 
alliance with the new regime.  
The next move was to turn to the industrial working class who had long been 
unfriendly towards the landed oligarchy and had often been suppressed by every 
government since 1916 making this group their golden ticket. Also, many of the military 
men who helped seize power had contacts within the labor movement, which was this 
group’s only voice. Perón had been named Director of the Department of Labor very 
soon after the June 4
th
 revolution and had set out expanding its power and activities.
189
 
Peron immediately placed other military men in control of the unions and charged them 
to find out what it was the unions wanted and whether an alliance between the regime and 
labor could be formed. The result was the conversion of the old Department of Labor into 
a new Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare, which held a cabinet level position for its 
first chief—Colonel Juan D Perón190  
From his rise to the head of the Department of Labor and the Secretariat of Labor 
and Social Welfare in 1943 to 1945, Perón threw most of his effort into expanding the 
labor movement. Alexander cites that there were approximately 300,000 to 350,000 
workers in Argentina. Within a couple of years, Alexander claims that the number of 
organized laborers in Argentina increased seven fold. Perón was said to have forced 
employers to recognize and negotiate with their workers’ unions. Also, he personally led 
packinghouse workers, sugar plantation workers, and other labor groups in campaigns 
against their employers.
191
 In many cases, Perón became the center of the collective 
bargaining process. He would insist that collective conflicts be brought to him for 
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conciliation and decision, ultimately leading to the notion that Perón was primarily 
responsible for an increase in a particular workers groups wage increase. 
Perón also began an extensive program of enacting labor and social security 
legislation. For instance, by decree he pushed for a more extensive inspection process for 
factories to better ensure the safety of the worker. He also enacted a Social Security 
program, which affected a large majority of the country’s wage earning population. He 
also pushed for an extra months worth of pay for their workers at Christmas time, and a 
number of legal, paid holidays.
192
 
Perón’s control of the labor movement in Argentina had resulted in the creation of 
a powerful political machine that would ultimately spring him from imprisonment and 
catapult him to the presidency in 1946. Perón continued to use the labor movement to 
sustain his power and control throughout his presidency. However, he systematically 
limited their independence and autonomy eventually limiting their power. 
 Perón’s link to organized labor is starkly different from that of Dennis Chavez. 
Perón saw labor as means to an end, while Chavez looked at labor with reverence and 
respect. During the years that Dennis Chavez regularly visited Argentina, Perón’s 
progress with social reform through the use of the power of the labor unions, must have 
seemed quite impressive to Dennis Chavez. Because Dennis Chavez viewed labor with a 
certain amount of reverence, it is very likely that he viewed Perón’s success through 
labor with a similar reverence. In Dennis Chavez’s eyes, both men sought to bring social 
change to the working class and decrease the gap between the rich and the poor. But as 
Perón got deeper into his presidency, it must have become painfully clear to Dennis 
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Chavez, that Perón had only fought for labor for political gain—not out of concern for the 
worker.  
 Dennis Chavez’s support of Perón was controversial and problematic. In doing so, 
he seemed to ignore the contentious past between Argentina and the United States. With 
all the rhetoric and diplomatic maneuvering of Cordell Hull, it seemed implausible and 
uncharacteristic of Dennis Chavez to ignore direct and indirect suggestions in dealing 
with Argentina first at the International Labor Conference and in later years. In many 
respects, Dennis Chavez’s support for Perón seems highly suspicious. The link between 
Perón and Chavez and their support for labor and social programs is weak at best and 
does little to answer the posed question. There has to be something more that would 
prompt Dennis Chavez to look past the distrust of Perón and Argentina stemming from 
the initial Argentine Revolution of 1943 and well into the second half of the 20
th
 Century. 
Even so, it is the only link that is supported by the available documentary evidence, and 
therefore must suffice as an answer.
   96 
 
 
Chapter Five 
Puerto Rico 
 
One of the best examples of Dennis Chavez’s involvement in Latin American 
affairs can be found in his dealings with, and on behalf of Puerto Rico. Chavez viewed 
American actions towards Puerto Rico as indicative of how the United States would treat 
other states of Hispanic decent.  Because of this, he regularly got involved in economic 
and political matters pertaining to Puerto Rico including involving his own brother in the 
legal system. To Dennis Chavez, Puerto Rico was a barometer for how successful the 
Good Neighbor Policy would be received and implemented because he knew that the 
other Latin American countries were watching how the United States treated Puerto Rico. 
He worked his entire career to ensure that the island nation was well treated. In this last 
chapter we will explore how Dennis Chavez got involved with Puerto Rico especially 
through the Chavez Commission of 1942, some specific actions taken by him to promote 
the Puerto Rican economy and political system, and how he worked to promote Puerto 
Rican statehood. 
Chavez was interested in Puerto Rico for two reasons.  First and foremost, Puerto 
Rico was dominated by people of Spanish descent, and because of this, Chavez believed 
that the Latin American people were watching how the United Stated treated the Puerto 
Rican people. Finally, Puerto Rico was the only place that Dennis Chavez could have 
gone and attempted to make specific domestic policy changes and relate it to the Latin 
American people. This is because Puerto Rico was a protectorate of United States. 
During his political life, Dennis Chavez saw Puerto Rico grow from an island possession 
to a Commonwealth with its own constitution. He witnessed the affects that the Foraker 
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Act, the Jones Act, World War II, and the quest for statehood had on the Puerto Rican 
people. Chavez believed that the sincerity of the Good Neighbor Policy should be proven 
through the adoption of a clearly defined policy towards Puerto Rico.  
 Since the Spanish American war Puerto Rico had occupied a very unique and 
largely undefined station in United States history. In 1889, the United States took 
possession of Puerto Rico as a direct result of winning the Spanish American War. 
Almost immediately, the United States began to organize Puerto Rico’s political structure 
similar to that of the United States’ political system. The first broad spectrum law passed 
in Puerto Rico was the Foraker Act of 1900, which gave the President of the United 
States the right to appoint the governor, the cabinet, and all judges. This Act was largely 
unpopular with the Puerto Rican people for it only gave them the right to elect a lower 
house of 30 delegates. It also sent the message that the Puerto Rican people were 
regarded as unfit for full political participation. Also in that same year, free trade was 
opened up between Puerto Rico and the United States, which in turn caused an influx of 
United States investment, especially in sugar plantations. With the wealth being 
concentrated in the hands of a few, the peasant worker had very little choice but to work 
in the sugar cane fields, thus sowing the seeds of discontent and distrust. This discontent 
was furthered the next year, when on December 2
nd
 the United States Supreme Court 
ruled that Puerto Ricans were not United States citizens.  
 As time went on the Puerto Rican people began to agitate for a definition of their 
status with the United States, both as citizens and as a territory. Their questions were only 
partly answered in 1917 with the signing of the Jones Act, which made Puerto Rico a 
territory and granted United States citizenship to the Puerto Rican people. Voting was 
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also made compulsory, and proportional representation was established. However, at the 
same time Puerto Rico continued to be run by appointed governors who had very little 
knowledge of the Puerto Rican people or their culture. With the onset of World War I, 
Puerto Rico became less of a focal point in United States interests, outside of the draft. 
Being United States citizens, Puerto Rican men were thus eligible for the draft. During 
the war, about 18,000 men were inducted into the service—a fact Dennis Chavez later 
used as justification for full statehood.  
 By 1930 Puerto Rico was radically changed economically by the arrival of 
American capital. Coffee, which was the predominant crop before the arrival of the 
American influence, had been supplanted by sugar. By 1930, sugar was grown on nearly 
50 percent of the island’s cultivated land. By 1930, the economic conditions had 
deteriorated to the point that Puerto Ricans were employed in harsh, low paying 
sweatshops, if they could find a job at all—60 percent of the population was without 
employment all together. By 1933, the Roosevelt administration took a larger interest in 
the Puerto Rican situation. Even though the conditions on the mainland were bad, the 
conditions in Puerto Rico were much worse. Roosevelt attempted to use measures that 
resembled the programs employed in the United States, such as the Homeowners Act of 
1933, and the WPA, but these programs had a very little impact on the Puerto Rican 
situation.  
Up to this point, Dennis Chavez was largely silent on Puerto Rican issues. In fact 
the earliest dated documentation found in reference to Puerto Rico and Dennis Chavez 
was a letter written to him from Filipo L De Hostos in 1933. De Hostos, a lawyer from 
San Juan who apparently occupied no political significance, wrote Dennis Chavez 
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thanking him for his support of the Home Owners Act of 1933. This Act was a New Deal 
program designed to provide the means to purchase affordable housing. In 1933, homes 
were sent to foreclosure at a rate of 1,000 per day and the average borrower was 
delinquent two years on his mortgage and three years on his taxes. The United States 
Government extended non-interest bearing loans to homeowners who met certain criteria, 
in an effort to keep people in their homes. This was a national program, but had 
implications in Puerto Rico as well.
193
 Dennis Chavez supported this program much the 
same way he supported most of the New Deal programs—he simply voted yes on them. 
In response to his efforts, De Hostos wrote, “You have proved yourself such a good and 
loyal friend of Puerto Rico and so genuinely interested in its affairs that you would be 
glad to learn of a Puerto Rican enterprise that is rendering a great service to the 
community.”194 This letter was of little significance, but it does point to a single unique 
situation in which Dennis Chavez was thanked by a Puerto Rican citizen much the same 
way a New Mexican citizen would thank him for his vote.  
Other than the De Hostos letter, the record is largely silent when it comes to 
Dennis Chavez and Puerto Rico until Bolivar Pagan wrote to him for help with Governor 
Rexford Tugwell in 1942. Pagan was a distinguished historian, journalist, and politician 
from Puerto Rico. He was appointed Resident Commissioner to the United States House 
of Representatives by Governor William B. Leahy in 1939, and served on the 
Committees on Agriculture, Labor, Territories, Insular Affairs, Military Affairs, and 
Naval Affairs. Bolivar Pagan, who was a strong proponent of Puerto Ricans electing their 
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own governors, introduced a number of bills to achieve that end, but never saw the 
satisfaction of seeing any of them passed. He also is noted for bringing to the attention of 
Congress the overall dissatisfaction of Puerto Ricans with Governor Tugwell.
195
  
 On February 24, 1942 Pagan claimed that a letter was sent to Dennis Chavez full 
of “irresponsible falsehoods” to purposefully mislead the United States Congress to 
believe that the majority of the people in Puerto Rico supported Governor Tugwell. 
Pagan claimed in his letter to Chavez that the political situation in Puerto Rico was very 
abnormal in that splits in the major parties during the last general election had resulted in 
the formation of a third party called Popular, headed by a “Communist” by the name of 
Luis Munoz Marin. To everyone’s surprise Marin was elected by ten of the nineteen 
members of the Insular Senate, and eighteen of the thirty nine members of the House.
196
 
Pagan believed that this was abnormal because his party, the Coalition, received the 
majority of the popular vote, which elected the Resident Commissioner, and carried the 
majority of the municipal government positions. He argued that the Coalition was the 
party that upheld the American principles of government and way of life through the 
continuance of maintaining ties with the United States, with the goal of eventually 
obtaining statehood. In contrast, the Popular Party, headed by Luis Munoz Marin, was a 
secessionist party based on the Communist principles of public distribution of land. 
During the election, Pagan cited how the Popular party promised the peasants and poor 
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farmers of Puerto Rico a “small farm, with milk cows, oxen, seeds, plows and all farming 
implements,” essentially attempting to purchase their votes.197  
 Pagan believed that Governor Tugwell was disregarding the Coalition’s rights, 
which represented the democratic majority of the people. He cited how Tugwell had 
given all the key and minor posts in the Insular Government to members of the Popular 
Party and was giving into the demands of Luis Munoz Marin. Pagan’s arguments 
originated from the election of members to the Puerto Rican House in 1940. The Popular 
Party secured 215,000 votes, and the Coalition received about 222,000 of the votes. The 
slim victory entitled the Coalition to the position of Resident Commissioner. However, 
when it came to the seats in the Puerto Rican Legislature the Coalition and the Popular 
Party won the same number of seats. Pagan felt that Tugwell should have given an equal 
number of posts to each party to maintain a balance of power. Pagan also might have felt 
that Tugwell was “bought” by Munoz and the Popular Party with the chancellorship of 
the University of Puerto Rico, which Tugwell accepted, but resigned two weeks later 
after heated protests. Pagan also called attention to Tugwell’s inaugural address in which 
he suggested that Puerto Rico would be a “very nice place for testing new social 
experiments with monies from the Federal Treasury,” essentially insinuating that Tugwell 
planned on creating a Socialist society. Pagan also claimed that Tugwell sponsored 
Puerto Rico’s independence—which Pagan regarded as a “slap at the face” toward the 
overwhelming majority of Puerto Rico.
198
  
There is no record of Dennis Chavez ever responding to this letter; however, 
Pagan’s attacks on Tugwell persisted not just to Dennis Chavez, but to the United States 
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Congress. Pagan’s attacks ranged from blaming Tugwell for the limited space for 
shipping to laying the foundation for a “social experiment.” 199 Pagan’s and others 
complaints resulted in a number of bills being introduced regarding Puerto Rico between 
1942 and 1945. Two of the most notorious results of Pagan’s complaints were the 
creation of two sub-committees to be sent to Puerto Rico to study the economic and 
social conditions of Puerto Rico. One committee was a House Subcommittee headed by 
Congressman C. Jasper Bell of Missouri, and the other was a Senate subcommittee 
headed by Dennis Chavez. In many respects both committees were sent to Puerto Rico 
under the auspices of examining the socioeconomic condition of the island, but also were 
to investigate the Tugwell administration.
200
 Pagan’s attacks on Tugwell directly added to 
the creation of these two committees sent in 1943. 
On October 20
th
 1942, during World War II, Dennis Chavez submitted Senate 
Resolution 309 to make a full and complete study of the economic and social conditions 
in Puerto Rico resulting from the interruption of the normal flow of trade between the 
United States and Puerto Rico as a result of World War II.
201
 Senate Resolution 26 of the 
78
th
 Congress, authorized the formation of the United States Sub-Committee of the 
Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, which came to be known as the Chavez 
Commission, and limited it to a total of $15,000 in expenditures. By February 13
th
 the 
Chavez Commission was in San Juan, Puerto Rico ready to commence with its 
assessment of the islands economic and social conditions. The committee was naturally 
chaired by Dennis Chavez with other members being J. Ellender, Homer T. Bone, Robert 
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A. Taft, and Ralph O. Brewster. During the investigation the members of the Chavez 
Commission toured the island and conducted interviews with many members of the 
business community, school system, and government. One of the first topics to be tackled 
was shipping to and from the island, one of Pagan’s main arguments against Tugwell. 
With Puerto Rico being detached from the United States mainland, shipping was 
the main life-line between the United States and Puerto Rico. All of Puerto Rico’s cash 
crops, which were relied on heavily to create jobs and opportunity, where shipped off the 
island. Also, at the time of the Commission, over half of Puerto Rico’s food, and all of its 
industrial and agricultural machinery and supplies were imported.
202
 Because of this 
reliance, Puerto Rico was hit hard during the peak of submarine warfare in 1942. As a 
result, the Chavez Commission uncovered that in September 1942 Puerto Rico received a 
total of 3,000 tons of cargo per month, compared to its normal 100,000 tons of cargo per 
month. This sharp reduction in cargo space caused protests and panic from all strata of 
the Puerto Rican population. By December of 1942, almost all food stock had been 
depleted. The monthly tonnage assigned to Puerto Rico was insufficient to cover monthly 
consumption, much less to build up reserves.
203
 The lack of food supplies snowballed 
into a situation of catastrophic proportions. 
With shipping limited, the economy in Puerto Rico was trapped in a vicious cycle. 
Merchants could not import or export goods, and therefore could not pay their 
employees, creating a large unemployment problem. A failure of merchants to pay their 
wholesalers and bankers resulted in a cash-only business, which essentially destroyed the 
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existing credit structure all the way down to the individual consumer. Commerce on the 
island relied on the credit system that was in place. Removing it naturally created 
economic hardship on the merchants and individuals.
 204
 The Chavez Commission 
revealed that most wholesalers had been systematically cutting credit to retailers which in 
turn cut their ability to pay back credit received prior to this situation, ultimately 
digressing into the creation of a black market system.
205
 Also, part of the problem with 
the credit issue was the fact that most of the small retailers only dealt with the 
wholesalers, not the banks, which hurt them in the long run. 
Aside from the lack of credit, the Chavez Commission also revealed that the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) controlled all space for the shipping of foodstuffs, and 
whatever was left over for other cargo was controlled by the Interior Department in 
Washington D.C. The Chavez Commission established that the controls in place by the 
FDA were inefficient and poorly managed. The Chavez Commission cited how the FDA 
would ship 1,100 tons of oats, but only use eighty tons per month were consumed in 
Puerto Rico. Yet month after month they received 1,100 tons of oats. This essentially 
demonstrated how shipments did not conform to the needs of the island.
206
 Essentially the 
FDA brought too much of one item and too little of another
207
 For instance, the island 
only had 15 percent of the rice they needed in November of 1941.
208
 According to Dr. 
Pablo Morales, Director of the School of Tropical Medicine, similar situations were 
occurring with beans, codfish and other critical foodstuffs, and the people of Puerto Rico 
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were facing starvation.
209
 This in turn created a situation where people were hoarding 
certain goods and selling them on the profitable black market.
210
 Because of the 
mismanagement of shipping space and food allocation, economic and social conditions 
deteriorated to a point of crisis—with merchant stores and warehouses being empty 
leaving many employees and equipment idle. Even if there was food in the stores, the 
people generally could not afford to buy it. 
Another major problem in Puerto Rico was that its economy relied too heavily on 
one cash crop—sugar.  The largest industry in Puerto Rico had always been sugar 
production, and it had long dominated the lives of many Puerto Ricans. The history of the 
sugar industry in Puerto Rico was essentially the history of Puerto Rico itself. Up until 
1900, the mills on the island were small and largely inefficient only producing about 
thirty five tons of cane per day with transportation being the largest obstacle. Only the 
sugar mills subsidized by the Spanish Crown were able to produce at modern day 
capacity—and most of those were located near coastal regions with direct access to 
shipping. The cultivation of sugar was seen as the privilege of the rich—only those who 
had sufficient money to establish a mill could cultivate cane without the support of the 
Spanish Crown. 
Eventually, improved equipment during the later part of the 19
th
 century reduced 
the cost of production. However, Puerto Rico lacked the financial capital to invest in new 
machinery and technology. Improved production methods and larger output by other 
countries essentially caused Puerto Rico to struggle to compete. For instance, in 1899, 
207 mills in Cuba had a capacity fifteen times greater than a similar number of mills in 
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Puerto Rico.
211
 Puerto Rico survived enough to expand its mill railroads to small growers 
who were previously unable to produce cane for shipment because they were simply too 
far from the mills. As the mill railroads grew, so too did the number of small cane 
farmers. In 1889 there were seven growers per mill as compared to 278 growers per mill 
in 1939. This was also aided by the reduction of mills from 345 to forty one.
212
 The 
advent of large scale production of sugar cane in Puerto Rico allowed them to compete 
with other large sugar producing regions. Capital accumulated, leading to increased 
Puerto Rican ownership of sugar properties to the point that there were no foreign owned 
mills by 1943. Furthermore, more and more Puerto Ricans owned stock in the American-
owned sugar companies operating in Puerto Rico.
213
  
If the Chavez Commission were to address any of Puerto Rico’s economic and 
social problems, Dennis Chaves knew he must address the sugar industry. The Chavez 
Commission revealed that Puerto Rico’s sugar industry was comprised of forty sugar 
mills occupying about 300,000 acres of land, and was operated by about 12,000 owners. 
The forty mills varied in capacity from those grinding a few tons a day to some of the 
largest mills in the world. There were sixteen family and individual holdings, five 
partnerships, seventeen company holdings, and two government run mills. The farms 
varied equally as much in size. They ranged from a few acres to several thousand acres. 
In fact, 75 percent of the farms growing cane were ten acres or less.
214
 In 1943, 88 
percent of the cane was grown on land owned by Puerto Ricans, and 12 percent was 
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grown on mills owned by residents of the continental United States.
215
 At the time of the 
Chavez Commission, sugar was the main commodity in Puerto Rico, and had the largest 
impact on the economic stability of the people.  
 The Chavez Commission further uncovered that there were more workers 
employed per square acre of sugar cane than in any other domestic area in Puerto Rico. 
At this time there was about 135,000 laborers employed in Puerto Rico’s sugar industry, 
100,000 of which were considered heads of households.
216
 The sugar industry in Puerto 
Rico was such a significant part of their economy that about 635,000 people were fed and 
supported by the production of sugar cane—both directly and indirectly. Once the harvest 
was done, the machinery of the mills was taken down and repaired, and the workers were 
put to work doing upkeep and incidental work. Testimony given by Mr. James A. Dickey, 
a representative of the Puerto Rican Sugar Industry, pointed out that “cleaning railways, 
cleaning equipment, general repair work, and planting and cultivating cane goes on year 
round” with very little of the workforce being displaced.217  
In 1943, the sugar industry was still thriving in Puerto Rico due in large part to 
the Farm Security Administration, under the United States Department of Agriculture, 
which was established in Puerto Rico on September 1, 1941. The WSA gave assistance to 
low income farmers not eligible for credit from normal agencies. They loaned them seed, 
fertilizer, livestock, machinery, and other household equipment. All of the loans were 
supposed to be repaid over a period of forty years at 3 percent interest. From 1941 to 
1943, the Farm Securities Administration of Puerto Rico helped set up 410 small farms, 
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most of which were sugar farms of less than sixty acres in size.
218
 In 1943 there were 
about 52,000 farmers of which 42,000 were small operations working fifteen acres or 
less.
219
 Most of what these farmers raised was sent to the market and sold. However, at 
this time, production in Puerto Rico had reached a plateau, but unfortunately it did not 
plateau in importance, due in large part because other industries such as tobacco, coffee, 
fruit, vegetables, and needlework had greatly declined.
220
  
The Chavez Commission investigated the impact that the United States sugar 
quota was having on Puerto Rico. They discovered that the restrictions imposed by the 
laws of the Sugar Act restricted Puerto Rico more heavily than other regions—even when 
Puerto Rico was the only domestic area to have filled its basic quota every year. In the 
last unrestricted year, Puerto Rico was able to produce approximately 1,500,000 tons of 
sugar, but the quota imposed a restriction of 800,000 tons in 1934, which amounted to a 
25 percent reduction—no other area suffered such a severe cut. In 1941, Louisiana’s 
quota was raised from 260,000 tons to 420,000 tons, whereas Puerto Rico’s quota was 
dropped to 797,000.
221
 Cuba received a sugar quota of 1,900,000 tons per year, which 
was double that of Puerto Rico and she was not even a part of the United States—a fact 
that drove Mr. James A Dickey to suggest an increase in Puerto Rico’s sugar quota to the 
Chavez Commission.
222
 Dickey argued, if Puerto Rico was allowed to produce to 
capacity, 50,000 to 60,000 more jobs would have been created helping out about 12,000 
to 15,000 families. He further argued that it took twenty to twenty five days to produce 
one ton of sugar, which, put the average amount per man at 200 days, which amounted to 
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about ten tons of sugar per worker a year. Thus, Dickey argued, the Sugar Quota denied 
7,000 families on the island an opportunity to work in the sugar industry. Coupling this 
with the rising costs of fertilizers and other means of production, the end result was more 
people were out of work and unable to buy goods and feed their families. 
223
  
Dennis Chavez and his committee discovered that many of the Puerto Rican 
people blamed the United States for the lack of jobs, food and access to proper medical 
care. They witnessed, as the economic situation got worse in Puerto Rico, fewer people 
were able to feed their families and take care of their sick. Because food and proper 
medical care were unavailable in Puerto Rico, the Chavez Commission revealed that the 
main cause of death was diarrhea and enteritis.
224
 Both of these aliments were due in 
large part to intestinal infections, food scarcity, and the lack of adequate sanitary 
conditions, with the most important being the contamination of the water supply. They 
also discovered that another large problem in Puerto Rico was tuberculosis due to poor 
ventilation and overcrowded homes. Sadly most of the deaths occurred in children below 
the age of two. The lack of food, below average medical care, and poor economic 
conditions perpetuated the deaths of the young and helpless.
225
  
Upon this discovery, the Chavez Commission called Dr. Pablo Morales Otero, 
Director of the School of Tropical Medicine, for an interview. During this interview, Dr. 
Morales stated that the basic problems of Puerto Rico’s health was “essentially a problem 
of nutrition and housing” 226 He claimed the health problems due to tuberculosis could be 
diminished significantly if the people of Puerto Rico could afford a better diet and better 
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housing. Also, Dr. Antonio Fernos Isern testified that Puerto Rico was not receiving 
adequate funding to carry out necessary medical practices; and that the best place to 
spend money would be on the water supply, because, “in urban areas the water supply is 
30 percent polluted and 100 percent in rural areas.”227 In Puerto Rico, the number of 
doctors was 500 to 2,000,000 people. Because a large portion of the water supply was 
contaminated and food scarce, the nurses and doctors were eating the same food and 
drinking the same water—creating a situation where the sick were taking care of the 
sick.
228
 
The medical issues in Puerto Rico drove Dennis Chavez to push hard on the 
Puerto Rican government for answers. Chavez wanted to know where the government 
was spending money on public health. To get this information Senator Chavez 
interviewed Rafael Buscaglia, then treasurer of Puerto Rico. Initially, Dennis Chavez 
wanted to know how much was being spent and where on public health issues. Mr. 
Buscaglia could not produce any numbers for the committee, which angered Chavez. 
Frustrated, Chavez said to Mr. Buscaglia, “You should know that there must be some 
records in the office to show how much money has been spent on every particular item. 
You should be able to furnish this information this afternoon. Haven’t you some records 
in your office?”229 From this incident, it was clear to Dennis Chavez that this government 
was being run very inefficiently. The Commission revealed how one section of 
government did not communicate with the other departments exacerbating the economic 
and social strife the people were going through. The Chavez Commission uncovered how 
the Auditor of Puerto Rico was not auditing what each agency was doing with the money 
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that was appropriated to them. Senator Chavez very snidely remarked, “That was the 
purpose of the creation of the Auditor, to check on the expenditures of the Insular 
Government, to see that the money was spent according to law!”230 Frustrated with this 
testimony, Dennis Chavez concluded the session and adjourned until the next day, where 
he did not get any further.  
In April of 1943, at the completion of the Chavez Commission’s inspection of 
Puerto Rico’s economic, medical and governmental institutions, they organized the 
problems of Puerto Rico into two groups—temporary or permanent. The temporary 
problems were those directly associated with a decrease in shipping due to World War II, 
and the effects of German submarine activity in the Caribbean. Permanent problems were 
classified as: (a) overpopulation, accentuated by the lack of arable land, the lack of 
emigration, the advancement of sanitation and modern medicine, and the continuation of 
a large birth rate; (b) need for new industries; (c) unemployment and low wages; (d) 
foreign trade.
231
 For these problems in particular, Dennis Chavez believed that a major 
shift in relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico needed to happen. For the 
temporary problems, the Chavez Commission came to the general consensus that 
shipping and control of foodstuff was the first priority, meaning an increase in the sugar 
quota bought from Puerto Rico coupled with increased shipping space. Third, 
unemployment would be curtailed by an increase in WPA activities and an increased 
investment in the needlework and clothing industries.  
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The final result of all investigations, Dennis Chavez’s commission and others, 
into the conditions in Puerto Rico, was Senate Bill 981 of the 78
th
 Congress on November 
1, 1943. This bill authorized the Federal Works Administrator to use government funds to 
provide “useful” jobs for the Puerto Rican people. The projects the Administrator was to 
put in place were schools, educational facilities, hospitals, clinics, anti-malarial facilities, 
sewers, roads, airports and other projects certified by the Secretary of War for the 
protection of the island. To pay for the relief of Puerto Rico it was decided that 50 
percent of all the taxes gathered from the production and sale of goods in Puerto Rico 
would be sent to a special fund to be administered by the Federal Works Administrator, 
who was required to submit a yearly report to Congress on where the monies were spent. 
Aside from providing money for Puerto Rico, this bill also made one final change in 
policy in the legislative process with Puerto Rico. No longer would the Legislature 
consider the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico together. It was felt that both island 
possessions had very distinct issues apart from one another, and to effectively deal with 
either, the two needed to be handled separately.
232
  
Dennis Chavez continued to talk about the plight of the Puerto Rican people and 
personally came to the conclusion that the basic economic problem of Puerto Rico was 
overpopulation, lack of land, and lack of viable and sustainable industries.
233
 Although 
sugar was its number one industry, he believed that it had not been developed to its 
fullest. Also, he argued that a diversified industrial base would prevent the Puerto Ricans 
from starving when the bottom fell out in the sugar industry. Dennis Chavez wrote, “The 
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only possible and apparent solution to the foregoing problems is the industrialization of 
the island.”234 The second largest industry in Puerto Rico was needlework, employing 
80,000 women making $8,000,000 in wages. Dennis Chavez stated that all industry was 
suffering because of a lack of shipping space due to the war. He believed that the Puerto 
Ricans wanted to work and develop industry, but they were held back by a lack of capital 
and opportunity.  
Dennis Chavez espoused that the people of Puerto Rico needed help and that it 
was the duty of the United States to find a solution. He also saw that it was to Americas’ 
advantage, in both a material and a spiritual sense to find this solution. It was an 
American problem, not just a Puerto Rican problem.
235
 During a radio interview, on 
March 10, 1944, Dennis Chavez was asked if the conditions in Puerto Rico were as 
desperate as the American people had been lead to believe? Dennis Chavez replied, 
“Worse…You can’t comprehend how hungry those Americans are in Puerto Rico until 
you see their starving bodies.”236 He also pointed out how the United States often was the 
good neighbor to Latin American countries, but that it often forgot to take care of its 
Puerto Rican citizens. He also noted how Puerto Rico had to overcome trade barriers 
much like any other country instead of being treated like a territory of the Union. He 
expressed that this was wrong since they were a part of the United States. He knew that 
the biggest challenge to helping the Puerto Rican people was engaging the Americans on 
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the mainland—to get them to understand that these people were American, not 
foreigners.
237
 
An interesting development in Dennis Chavez’s connection to Puerto Rico came 
with his effort to place his brother, David Chavez Jr., as a District Court Judge in Puerto 
Rico. There is no indication, other than cronyism, as to why Dennis Chavez would want 
his brother to get the position. Most likely, it was a matter of access. Dennis Chavez was 
aware of the position, and knew his brother could do the job; even if he did not know he 
wanted it.  
David Chavez Jr. was born in Albuquerque New Mexico on November 12, 1898. 
He attended college at the University of New Mexico where he graduated and 
immediately enlisted in the army during World War I. After the war he worked for the 
General Land Office while attending Law School at Georgetown University. He 
graduated with his LLB degree in 1922 and returned to New Mexico where he became an 
attorney for the State Land Office. In 1924 he was appointed to the District Attorney’s 
office for the First Judicial District of New Mexico where he served out an unexpired 
term and was reelected. He served as District Judge from January 1, 1936 to July 1, 1942 
after which he resigned to enter the armed service during World War II. He served until 
September 26, 1946 and retired as an inactive Colonel. Upon his discharge he returned to 
New Mexico and was re-nominated and re-elected to the judgeship of the First District 
again. This is where he was when his brother Dennis Chavez began encouraging his 
interest in the United States District Court in Puerto Rico.
238
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 Dennis Chavez believed that his brother, David Chavez Jr. was perfect for the 
job. He had the necessary legal experience plus experience living in and succeeding in 
New Mexico, which spent most of its history with the United States as a territory under 
Congressional control. A vacancy in the District Court of Puerto Rico gave him an 
opportunity to take care of Puerto Rico, his brother, and the Democratic Party. Upon 
hearing of the vacancy, Dennis Chavez wrote Gael Sullivan, Executive Director of the 
Democratic National Committee, and requested his assistance in gaining the appointment 
for his brother.
239
 
Dennis Chavez began a firestorm of support before his brother David was even 
aware of the opening because he “didn’t want to take any chances of having anyone else 
getting in on the ground floor first.”240 The story, as told by Dennis Chavez, was that 
after hearing that Judge Cooper was retiring and being approached about another 
nominee, Dennis Chavez took Senator Hatch aside to a cloakroom and both came to the 
conclusion that David Chavez would be the natural candidate. They called Tom Clark, 
the Attorney General right away and told him they had a candidate for the job, and to not 
make any commitments until Hatch and Chavez talked with him. After talking with 
Clark, they got an appointment to talk with the President as soon as possible. They made 
the appointment for April 3, 1947.
241
 There is no documentation indicating that the 
meeting was held as scheduled, but there is a strong indication that David Chavez did 
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meet with the President at sometime which led to Truman signing his certificate and 
confirmation on July 10, 1947.
242
  
Once his brother had been appointed, Dennis Chavez received letter after letter 
from many prominent senators pledging support to Dennis for his brother, David. Also 
many prominent citizens of Puerto Rico wrote Senator Chavez pledging support to his 
brother and gratitude for Dennis’ unwavering support for the people of Puerto Rico, who 
had no senatorial support. In many of these letters Dennis Chavez was referred to as 
“their senator”. 243 
After receiving the appointment, David Chavez Jr. moved his family to Puerto 
Rico. The political climate was rough to say the least in Puerto Rico and it turned out that 
David Chavez and his family found themselves caught in the middle of the situation. The 
Nationalist Party had developed into a terrorist-like organization bent on total secession 
from the United States. On January 20, 1948 a letter was sent to Dennis Chavez from J. 
Edgar Hoover describing the arrest of Victor Manuel Colon-Zayas who had written a 
threatening letter to his brother David Chavez Jr. on January 11, 1948. The letter 
contained a threat against David and his family. Also, the letter contained specific threats 
against President Truman and Dennis Chavez. Colon-Zayas demanded $10,000 in 
exchange for David’s, life. Colon-Zayas was charged with extortion and committed to the 
District Jail.
244
 Perhaps this was a portent of what was to come in 1954 when Lolita 
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Lebron, a Puerto Rican Nationalist, attacked the House of Representatives and attempted 
to assassinate President Truman. 
Finally, one of the little known desires of Dennis Chavez was that Puerto Rico 
should become a state in the Union. His belief in this matter was definitely influenced by 
his history in New Mexico. In her biography of Dennis Chavez, Rosemary Diaz tells of a 
young man growing up in New Mexico—a territory on the path to becoming a state. As 
Senator, Dennis Chavez received letter after letter asking for his political support in 
moving the Puerto Rican people towards statehood. For instance, in 1946, Chavez 
received a letter from Providencia R. De Villamil, President of the Puerto Rico Women’s 
Association for Statehood. She appealed to Dennis Chavez to exert his influence to 
prevent the President’s approval of Bill 51 passed by the Insular Senate over Tugwell’s 
veto. This bill, she claimed, would eliminate the teaching of English in Puerto Rican 
schools.
245
 Dennis Chavez believed that English was essential to the future of Puerto 
Rico, and needed to be taught in the school system. Dennis Chavez remarked on how 
English had been taught on the island since 1898 to one degree or another in public 
schools. According to the census of 1940, over 200,000 people “know English.” He also 
stated that the language issue was one of the most critical social problems of Puerto Rico 
since the 2,000,000 people on the island were American citizens. The lack of universal 
knowledge of English was not the fault of the Puerto Rican, but instead the educational 
system.
246
 Dennis Chavez, who taught himself English as a young man, knew of the 
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benefits to those who could master the English language. Also, he knew that English 
would be essential for Puerto Rico to become a state. 
While Dennis Chavez was in favor of statehood for Puerto Rico, he felt that the 
decision should be made by the voters of Puerto Rico themselves. He held this view 
partly because of his long established connections with the people of Puerto Rico, both 
political and familial. (His youngest daughter was married to a Puerto Rican man with 
whom she had three children).
247
 On July 16, 1959, Dennis Chavez introduced a bill to 
the Committee on Insular Affairs requiring the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to conduct 
a referendum to determine whether the people desired statehood.
248
 That referendum 
never took place, but Dennis Chavez believed that the people of Puerto Rico were 
dedicated to democracy and the preservation of the union between the United States and 
Puerto Rico.
249
 Dennis Chavez once stated “The word Independence has a great 
significance, and it appeals to the most laudable emotions, but in this particular instance, 
knowing the consequences of the independence of Puerto Rico, I feel that the majority of 
the people in the island want American Liberty, not Puertorican independence.” 250 
By 1962, Puerto Rico’s political status was a hot topic, especially surrounding the 
admittance of Alaska and Hawaii to the United States. Dennis Chavez believed that the 
admission of Alaska and Hawaii into the Union once and for all buried the old arguments 
used to block Puerto Rico’s admission into the Union. He noted how it used to be argued 
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that territories outside the continental limits of the United States should not be integrated 
into the Union. With the addition of Alaska and Hawaii, this exception, Chavez argued, 
no longer applied. Then there was the contention that the linguistic and cultural 
differences between Puerto Rico and the United States made statehood inadvisable. 
Dennis Chavez quickly pointed to the Spanish heritage in the Southwest and Florida, 
making this argument null and void. Secondly, three quarters of Hawaii’s population was 
non-white with people of Oriental decent dominating, making null and void the cultural 
argument.
251
 Chavez demonstrated how Puerto Rico had met the requirements for 
statehood as defined by Senate Report 1028. This report stipulated that:  
1. The inhabitants of the proposed new state are imbued with and are 
sympathetic toward the principles of democracy as exemplified in the 
American form of government.  
2. The proposed new state has sufficient population and resources to support 
state government and…carry its share of the cost of Federal Government.  
3. A majority of the electorate wish statehood. 252 
Dennis Chavez firmly believed that Puerto Rico qualified for statehood and met 
each of these criteria.
253
 He believed that admission of Puerto Rico as a state would take 
away an issue that the Communist Party in Latin America had seized upon to stir up 
resentment towards the United States. Also, Puerto Rico stood as a strategic gateway 
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between the Caribbean and the Atlantic and provided a strong defense against attempts to 
take the Panama Canal.
254
 
On May 17, 1962, Dennis Chavez introduced a joint resolution proposing an 
amendment to the Constitution of The United States granting representation in the 
Electoral College to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. They were to receive a number 
of electors equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress which 
they would have been allowed if they were a state. However, they shall not have more 
electors than the least populous state.
255
 Dennis Chavez received several letters from 
people all over the country asking if his bill would be ratified. If not, would he 
reintroduce it? One such writer proposed a caravan of automobiles from New York, 
Chicago, Philadelphia, Newark, and Detroit to Washington D.C. to demonstrate the 
interest Puerto Ricans on the continent had with Puerto Rico’s statehood. Dennis Chavez 
continued to show a sympathetic interest towards the people of Puerto Rico and lobbied 
for Puerto Rican statehood.
256
 Even after his death in 1962, Dennis Chavez continued to 
receive petitions from Puerto Ricans who desired statehood.
257
 
In many ways, Dennis Chavez was a perfect surrogate representative for Puerto 
Rico. He could speak Spanish, understood how to manipulate the federal system to 
develop an under-developed territory and knew that he could use Puerto Rico in his 
adoption of the Pan-American ideal. All speculation aside, Chavez’s involvement in 
Puerto Rico is probably his most impactful contribution to relations with the Latin 
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American people. It is not clear how he ended up on the Committee on Insular Affairs, or 
why he chose to become involved in the affairs of Puerto Rico in addition to those of his 
own state of New Mexico. Most likely, he was drawn to the plight of Puerto Rico because 
of his Hispanic background, the status of Puerto Rico as a quasi territory similar to New 
Mexico when he was growing up, and a deep belief that the sincerity of the Good 
Neighbor policy was being judged by how the United States treated Puerto Rico. Chavez 
knew that the nations of Latin America were watching closely how the United States 
treated the people of Puerto Rico, and could infer from that observation how they in turn 
would be treated under the Good Neighbor Policy. As a consequence, Chavez stayed in 
tune with the political and economic atmosphere in Puerto Rico, and regularly weighed in 
on certain issues pertaining to the development of her future. If nothing else, Chavez was 
a reassuring figure to Puerto Rico. He was a person they could point to and assume that 
he had their best interest at heart. He was their senator.
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion 
 
As we have seen, when Dennis Chavez’s story is told, very little is ever 
mentioned about his quest for Inter-American solidarity. Most often he is lauded as a 
prominent New Mexican Senator that helped shape that state into what it is today. As true 
as that is, Dennis Chavez had an ideal, a vision, that the entire Western Hemisphere 
would be united as allies, trading partners, and neighbors. Early on in his career, Dennis 
Chavez adopted the tenets of Inter-American Solidarity as a template for his vision of 
United States and Latin American relations. Inter-American Solidarity was the ideal that 
all the republics of the Western Hemisphere would be united in mutual benefit, whether it 
be in wartime or peacetime.  
Dennis Chavez argued for this ideal on many occasions throughout his entire 
career.  The first significant event in which Chavez argued for Inter-American Solidarity 
was during the years leading up to the United States involvement in World War II.  Once 
it appeared that Europe was going to be embroiled in another war, Dennis Chavez 
adamantly argued that the United States should focus its efforts on strengthening its ties 
with Latin American Republics, and limit its exposure to Europe. His rhetoric called for 
the rejection of any support that would draw the Untied States into another European war. 
Instead he argued for rapid and massive investment in Latin America as a means to 
secure both the Untied States’ economic and political future. Much of his rhetoric failed 
to produce action. In theory his vision and ideas made sense, but in practice they could 
not be accomplished. Dennis Chavez failed to recognize the connection the United States 
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had with Europe. In fact, most people in the United States at that time could identify 
more easily with Europe than with Latin America.  
After the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor, like all isolationists, Dennis 
Chavez’s rhetoric stopped. It was apparent at that moment that the United States and the 
world were in for a war the likes of which no one had ever seen. During the war, Dennis 
Chavez worked, in a very limited fashion, to maintain the flow of resources from Latin 
America. He was in no way a significant player in the procurement of vast quantities of 
resources. However, Chavez was involved in certain deals that surrounded the 
procurement of military weaponry for the Allied cause in Europe.   
After World War II was over, and the Cold War had begun, Dennis Chavez 
worked to further the Inter-American Solidarity ideal in direct opposition to Communism. 
Because of World War II, Latin American republics lost access to the European markets 
and became more and more reliant on the United States as a trading partner. Also during 
the war, under wartime consumption, many Latin American republics became too reliant 
on the United States to purchase their goods. Once the war was over, demand fell, leaving 
many countries unstable. Dennis Chavez saw this instability and bitterness towards the 
United States as fertile ground for the seeds of Communism. Dennis Chavez resurrected 
the Inter-American Solidarity ideal as a means to combat Communist infiltration and to 
stand in opposition to Russia worldwide. He even argued that Latin America was due a 
recovery package similar to the Marshal Plan. Just as before, Chavez’s rhetoric fell on 
deaf ears. He did have some success in using the threat of Russian infiltration into Latin 
America to complete the Inter-American Highway, increase education in Latin American 
countries, and call attention to the issues of poverty. 
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During the Post-War era, Dennis Chavez did find his way into a very precarious 
situation when it came to Argentina and Juan D Perón. It is not very clear as to how or 
why Dennis Chavez became involved with Perón and Argentina. However, it is very 
clear that Chavez made multiple trips to Argentina during a time when the United States 
was very distrustful of and non-supportive of Juan D Perón. Chavez had several meetings 
with Perón, and on one such occasion caused one of Perón’s cabinet members to be fired. 
Again, it is very unclear as to exactly what Dennis Chavez was up to in Argentina. His 
papers hardly mention it, and there is no mention of him and Argentina foreign relations 
in the congressional records or in the FBI data base. The most difficult aspect of his 
affinity towards Argentina and Perón is that it barely seems to fit into his ideal of Inter-
American Solidarity. Most of the other Latin American Republics refused to accept 
Argentina and her President into their fold.  All that is offered in this paper is a 
hypothesis that cannot be proven to a conclusion.  
The final and most significant impact Chavez had in Latin America was his 
support for Puerto Rico. During his tenure as a statesman, Puerto Rico was experiencing 
an identity crisis. Puerto Rico was not considered a state, nor was it an independent 
country. Chavez latched on to the Puerto Rican experience because he believed that if the 
United States were to make any inroads with Latin American Republics, Puerto Rico and 
its people had to be treated equitably. Dennis Chavez brought to the Puerto Rican people 
another voice to their struggle for an identity. He took correspondence, headed an 
economic commission to assess the islands economic situation, and finally argued for 
Puerto Rican statehood. Puerto Rico factors into his vision for Latin America as a show 
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piece--an example to the Latin American people of what to expect from the United States 
should true solidarity happen.   
 Dennis Chavez supported Latin America because of his belief in the ideal of 
Inter-American Solidarity and an affinity born out of a common Spanish ancestry. He 
often spoke of a strong union between the nations of the western hemisphere. He argued 
that it was the surest and most effective way to ensure that the United States would live in 
a state of peace. Dennis Chavez stated “I take special interest in Latin-American affairs, 
perhaps because I am of Spanish ancestry, but principally because I believe that a strong 
union of western hemisphere nations is the surest means of promoting international peace 
today. If our countries are strong industrially, economically, and politically, we can 
assure peace for the world because none will dare attack us.”258 
 This study was important because Dennis Chavez’s interests in Latin America 
have yet to be fully explored; there is much more work to be done. Through the 
exploration of the available resources it is clear that Dennis Chavez held a special interest 
for Latin America, but failed to exact any real tangible changes. During the years leading 
up to World War II, he spoke of isolating relations to Latin America and the Western 
Hemisphere, but failed to make any headway in making it a reality. Chavez was 
unsuccessful largely due to his underestimation of the connectivity between the United 
States and Europe, born out of economic centers of influence and cultural background. 
While Latin America had its connectivity to Spain, the United States was undoubtedly 
connected to Britain, France, and yes, Germany.  
                                                 
258
 Chavez, Dennis, Good Highways –Promoters of Good Will, Speech delivered before the American Road 
Builders Association, February 9, 1949, box 73, folder 4, Dennis Chavez Papers, MSS 394,Center for 
Southwest Research, University of New Mexico. 
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Overall, Dennis Chavez made many friends in Latin America, from the peasant 
farmer to the heads of state. Some of these so called friends were controversial figures. 
Juan D. Perón was regarded as fascist leaning dictator in Argentina, yet Chavez visited 
Perón on many occasions. Similarly, Chavez had close relations with President Somoza 
of Nicaragua who was generally considered a dictator with a penchant for violence. It is 
the support for these individuals that lost Chavez some credibility. How could he argue 
for peace and the rights of the people, and support these repressive regimes? By and large 
Chavez was a politician. He used rhetoric to gain support for his ideas and yet knew that 
he must court the people in power.  
 It is interesting to ponder where the state of relations with Latin America and the 
United States would be if the advice of Dennis Chavez had been put into action. Would 
Latin America have experienced the multiple revolutions from the late 50’s to the 80’s? 
Would the United States have such major issues with Venezuela, Cuba, and others today? 
These questions cannot be answered of course. The truth is that Latin America has had a 
long and complicated history with the United States. During his time as a Senator, 
Chavez spoke up for better relations with Latin America, but ultimately he failed to make 
any significant changes. Relations with Latin America continue to be dominated by the 
United States due to its economic and political power—a position that does not look to be 
changing soon.     
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